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Using descriptive, bivariate, regression, correlation and time series analysis from
several sources, this study investigated linking state control and funding of public
higher education together in order to explore the likelihood of privatization of public
higher education. Privatization was defined as the cumulative result of a shift in
primary funding sources from state appropriated funds to non-governmental funds
over time to meet the current operating expenses of an institution.  The study included
369 four-year public institutions of higher learning from all 50 states that completed
the Department of Education’s Higher Education General Information Survey
(HEGIS), and the Integrated Postsecondary Educational Data System (IPEDS) from
1967 to 1996 and United States census data.  Study variables included state, student
and institutional contributions to funding in addition to indicators of state funding and
control.
The data and analysis presented, showed that public institutions of higher learning
have become funded proportionally more from private sources than from state
appropriated sources over the past 30 years. There was no relationship between past
state funding and past state control of public institutions of higher education, nor
between present state funding and control, or future state funding and control. The
results of the study were plotted for each state onto a four-sector Likelihood of
viii
Privatization Matrix, creating a finance-control conceptual model explaining the
privatization of public colleges and universities. The concept of privatization may
reframe the basic notion of what it means to be a public institution of higher learning
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Chapter I
The Problem and Its Background
“If privatization is not exactly an idea whose time has come,
it is a phenomenon whose presence is pervasive.”
-Zemsky, R., Wegner, G.R., & Iannozzi, M. (1997)
Introduction
Volumes of literature have been written regarding the price students pay for
college, many of them creating a widespread feeling that something is not quite
right with higher education (Bowen, 1981; Callan, 1997; Halstead, 1996; Harvey &
Immerwahr, 1993; Trombley, 2003; Troutt, 1998).  More critical accounts indicate
that the problem of increasing college costs is not simply a matter of controlling
expenditures, but of recognizing the states’ declining support for higher education
(Halstead, 1996; McKeown-Moak, 2000; Mortenson, 1998).  In most cases the
discourse stops after describing funding shortfalls.  Rarely are the consequences of
these funding trends critically considered (Callan & Finney, 1997; Callan 2003;
Gumport & Jennings, 1999; Mortenson, 1998).  What has only recently emerged  in
the literature, and which could be considered both cause and consequence, is the
connection between state financing and state control of higher education (Gose,
2002; Selingo 2003b).
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State control of public higher education is considered publicly much less
often than is state financing of higher education.  State regulation of higher
education gained some prominence in 1996 and 1997 during a round of debates
between Republicans in congress and the democratic Clinton administration.  The
Republicans were calling for increased regulation of higher education in order to
control costs through amendments to the Higher Education Act.  In 1997 President
Clinton appointed a group of educators and policy leaders to a national commission
called the Commission on The Cost of Higher Education, which was responsible
for evaluating national issues related to higher education costs (Troutt, 1998).  The
Commission released it’s report in January 1998.  The Commission cited
governmental regulation as a major expense for institutions of higher learning.
Most recently, federal regulation of higher education has emerged as a way to
respond to rising costs (Clayton, 2003).  Representative Howard “Buck” McKean
from California has proposed federal regulations intended to control the price
charged to students to attend public institutions of higher learning.  There appears
to be early bipartisan support of a plan that would link federal support of higher
education to tuition and fee limits.
For the purposes of this study, state control of higher education is the extent
to which a state controls the financial and academic operations of their public
institutions.  Control is viewed on a continuum with institutions operating in an
environment of more or less control as compared to other institutions in other
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states.  The higher the level of state control, the less autonomous the institution, and
the more dependent the institution is upon state review and approval for typical
operations.
Additionally, for the purposes of this study, state funding of higher
education is focused on the extent to which public institutions of higher learning
can expect state funding in the future.  Therefore, the focus is not  on how much
funding is allocated by the state to the institution, but more importantly, on the
state’s sustained funding of public institutions over time.  As a result, the study
focuses  on changes in funding over time rather than on actual funding levels.
Many higher education leaders continue to believe that declining state
funding is cyclical and there will be a return to greater state investment in higher
education (Penley, 1997, Zemsky & Wegner, 1997).  On the other hand, a growing
body of research suggests that the national decline in state appropriations for post-
secondary education is not cyclical but, in fact, is leading to the privatization of
public colleges and universities (Callan & Finney, 1997; Gose, 2002; Gumport &
Jennings, 1999).  Privatization is defined as the shifting of the proportion of public
state appropriated funds to non-state sources such as student tuition/fees, contracts
for services and grants, and gifts as the principal institutional funding sources
(Zemsky, R., Wegner, G.R., & Iannozzi, M., 1997).  In a March 7, 1998,
commentary for The Chronicle of Higher Education, David Breneman, Dean of the
Curry School of Education at the University of Virginia, questioned whether the
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privatization of public universities is a mistake or a model for the future.
Breneman conceded that public institutions have negotiated more autonomy in light
of diminished state funding, but he was skeptical that state funding could decline to
a level that would actually lead to a de facto privatization of public institutions.
However, four years later in 2002 James Duderstadt, former president of the
University of Michigan, was quoted in The Chronicle of Higher Education that
flagship universities might actually exchange state funding for greater autonomy in
order to better pursue their missions (Gose, 2002). Over the last 30 years, The
University of Michigan has aggressively pursued private non-governmental funds
transforming itself into a quasi-private institution of higher learning.
In light of the shifting nature of government funding of institutions of
higher education, the Department of Education’s National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES) may find a need to redefine what constitutes a public institution
of higher learning.  The NCES currently defines a public institution as “[A]n
educational institution whose programs and activities are operated by publicly
elected or appointed school officials and which is supported primarily by public
funds” (IPEDS, 1997).
This study will analyze the proportion of public to private funding and will
consider how much state funding constitutes being “supported primarily by public
funds” (IPEDS, 1997).  In the late 1990s, the University of Delaware noted in its
institutional literature that approximately 10 percent of the institution’s budget
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comes from the state of Delaware.  State appropriations accounted for less than 13
percent of the operating budgets  at Pennsylvania State University and the
University of Virginia.
The public-private funding lines appear to be blurring between private and
public institutions of higher learning (Gumport, 1999). An example of state funding
private higher education occurs in the state of Texas, which annually allocates
funds to private institutions through the Texas Equalization Grant (TEG) program.
In 1995 the TEG allocation of $37.2 million was approximately 3 percent of the
total funding for Texas private institutions. In 1998 the TEG increased 21 percent
to $47.2 million. Government funds supporting private institutions and private
funds supporting public institutions increase the already complex financial nature
of higher education.
Understanding the combination of past, current, and future funding- control
relationships within the private-public funding context will produce valuable data
that will assist higher education leaders, state legislators and public policy makers
in strategic planning and budgeting of future resources.  Quantifying the changing
definition of public institutions of higher learning will provide a theoretical model
which will account for the evolving relationship between states and what is
currently referred to as public higher education.
For higher education leaders, this area of research provides a context for
evaluating higher education administration, including issues of institutional mission
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and organizational structure.  The relationship between public and private financing
is a substantial policy issue for politicians as it relates to state spending priorities
(Selingo, 2003).  Lawmakers annually consider how state tax dollars should be
allocated to higher education in comparison to other state obligations, including K-
12 education, prisons, transportation and health care.  Citizens may find this
research area significant in response to the growing national anxiety over how to
pay for higher education.  Declining institutional sovereignty, increasing legislative
regulation and continuing public concern may be the consequences of what the
National Commission on the Cost of Higher Education (1998) cited as an “opaque
relationship” between costs and prices that exist in higher education.  Simply put,
individuals both inside and outside of higher education do not understand the
connection between prices, costs and subsidies. Bowen (1981) asked the classic
educational economic question: Who should pay for higher education?  Possibly,
the corollary question should be: Who should control higher education?
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to analyze systematically the relationship
between states and public institutions of higher learning.  Data generated from this
study will provide a more developed understanding of the relationship between the
funding and control of public higher education.  This study analyzes the premise
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that the historical decline in the proportion of state funding to public higher
education is not cyclical but is the result of a permanent redefinition of public
higher education.  Consequently, this study intends to examine the extent to which
state government funds and controls public higher education.
Statement of the Problem
It is well reported that state funding of public higher education has declined
and that costs are being shifted to non-governmental sources.  Questions are being
asked regarding the extent to which states should control public higher education in
an environment of reduced public support.  This study examines the relationship
between funding and control.
Significance
This study examines the relationship between state funding and state control
of public higher education.  This relationship has not been widely studied
heretofore.  Developing a better understanding of the combination of funding-




The following are definitions used in this study:
Academic Flexibility : The extent to which states control academic aspects of
public colleges and universities. (Volkwein, 1983)
Cost: “What institutions spend to provide education and related educational services
to students (Troutt, 1998, p.9).”
Cost Per Student: “The average amount spent annually to provide education and
related services to each full-time equivalent student (Troutt, 1998, p.9).”
Education  (EDUC):  The percentage of citizens 25 years old or older with four or
more years of higher education by state.  (US Census)
Fiscal Flexibility (FiscalFlex): The extent to which states control fiscal aspects of
public colleges and universities.  (Volkwein, 1983)
General Subsidy: “The difference between the cost to the institution of providing
an education ("cost per student") and the tuition and fees charged to students
("sticker price").  Students who attend institutions of higher education, regardless
of whether they attend public or private colleges or universities, or whether they
receive financial aid, typically receive a general subsidy.  This general subsidy does
not include subsidies some students receive from scholarships and other types of
financial aid (Troutt, 1998, p.9).”
Government Appropriations: Funding received through acts of a legislative body,
except grants and contracts, that help meet current operating expenses. (IPEDS,
Form F-1, 1997).
Institutional Privatization: The cumulative result of a shift in primary funding
sources from state appropriated funds to non-governmental funds over time to meet
the current operating expenses of the institution.
Price: “What students and their families are charged and what they pay to attend
institutions of higher learning (Troutt, 1998, p.9).”
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Privatization:  The year in which state appropriations in a particular state are
predicted to reach zero. The sooner a state is predicted to reach zero, the more
privatized public higher education is in that state.
Public Institution: “An educational institution whose programs and activities are
operated by publicly elected or appointed school officials and which is supported
primarily by public funds (IPEDS, Form F-1, 1997).”
Republican (REPUB):  The percentage of citizens who voted Republican in
presidential elections by state.
State Payment Effort: The state appropriations allocated to each college student
divided by the tax revenue per capita of the citizens within a state (Halstead, 1996).
State Tax Effort: “State and local government tax revenue collected as a percent of
state total taxable resources (tax potential) (Halstead, 1998, p.11).
State Tax Wealth: The state and local government tax revenue collected per capita
from the citizens within a state (Halstead, 1996).
State Tax Wealth Relative To Enrollment Load: “The state and local tax revenue
per full time equivalent student attending a public college or university (Halstead,
1996).”
State Share of Total Revenue:   The ratio of state appropriations to total operational
funding for a public institution of higher learning.
Sticker Price: “The tuition and fees that institutions charge (Troutt, 1998, p.9).”
Total Price of Attendance: “The tuition and fees that institutions charge students as
well other expenses related to obtaining a higher education.  These expenses could
include housing (room and board if the student lives on campus, or rent or related
housing costs if the student does not live on campus), books, transportation, etc.




Descriptive, bivariate, regression, correlation and time series analyses were
conducted using data from several sources.  These sources included the revenue
sections of the Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) and the
Integrated Postsecondary Educational Database System (IPEDS) financial survey,
state trend data developed by Kent Halstead with Research Associates of
Washington, estimates of privatization from Postsecondary Opportunity published
by Tom Mortenson, United States Census data, and measures of institutional
control as developed by Fredricks Volkwein.   The study included 369 public
institutions of higher learning.  Two hypotheses that were further subdivided into
six research questions were tested.
The First Hypothesis stated that “Public institutions of higher learning have
over time become funded proportionally more by private sources than by state
appropriated sources.”  The following research questions were developed and
answered in order to test the hypothesis:
1. What was the actual rate of shift from state funds to non-governmental
funds over time by state and by institutional type?
2. What variables have influenced these shifts?
3. Based on the rate of shifting from state to non-governmental funds over
time, which states and institutional types are more likely to become
increasingly privatized?
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The Second Hypothesis stated that “State funding of public institutions of
higher learning is not related to state control.” The following research
questions were developed and answered in order to test the hypothesis:
4. What variables indicate state control of public higher education, and
how have these variables changed over time?
5. How strong was the relationship between state control and state
funding of public institutions of higher learning over time?
6. Based on the past relationship between state control and state
funding of public institutions of higher education, what is the
predicted relationship by state and by institutional type?
Limitations
This study was limited by the construction of the data sources.  Specifically,
the primary data sources for this study were the Department of Education HEGIS
(Higher Education General Information Survey) and IPEDS (Integrated
Postsecondary Education Database System ) databases.  HEGIS and IPEDS
revenue databases are combined into a single database that is managed by the
Department of Education’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).  Data
from fiscal years 1966-67 to 1995- 96 were used from this database. The 1995-96
data were the most recently available at the time of this study
The study looked at the proportional relationship between funding sources.
One of the primary assumptions defining the study was not to determine how much
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a funding source supported higher education, but just to understand the
proportionality or the relationship between the funding sources.
Finally, another limitation of the study related to the variables developed by
Kent Halstead with Research Associates of Washington.  Halstead’s data were
computed by state and not by institution.  In order to make preliminary inferences
regarding the trends across institutional type, Halstead’s data were first analyzed by
state. In order to analyze these data by institutional type, state values had to be
assigned to each of the institutions within a particular state, and then aggregated by
type.   Another limitation was the discontinuation of reports generated with these
data in 1998.  Future study of institutional types would be more robust using data
that are developed at the institutional level.
Summary
Connecting higher education funding information to higher education
control provides a new perspective from which to expand the study of higher
education. Specifically, this new perspective allows for a deeper examination of the
relationship between funding and control, providing an opportunity to review
existing assumptions about what is meant by the term “public institution of higher
learning.”  This study will advance an emerging body of literature that is
attempting to define the effects of privatization within the academy.  Chapter II will
13





The character and purpose of colleges and universities largely regulate
the matter of financial support, and profound changes in character and
purpose have taken place since higher education was established in
America. -Greenleaf, 1930, p.254
Introduction
In order to provide a full contextual understanding of how this study
contributes to the existing literature on higher education, this review is divided into
four parts: "Historical Review of the Finance and Control of Higher Education,"
"State Financing of Higher Education," "State Control of Higher Education" and
"Privatization of Higher Education."  The "Historical Review" considers how
public institutions of higher learning have been funded and controlled during four
historical periods during which the institutions (colonial college, land grant
institution, research university, and metropolitan university) were established.  The
second part, "State Financing of Higher Education," presents literature that
provides political- and policy-oriented research related to the current condition of
financing post-secondary education.  The section on "State Control of Higher
Education" summarizes the existing research regarding state regulation of public
higher education.  Finally, the fourth section reviews an emerging collection of
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research under the rubric of "Privatization of Higher Education" that attempts to
explain the shift away from state funds to non-state funds as the primary funding
source for public institutions of higher education.
Historical Review of the Finance and Control of Higher Education
The history of finance and control of higher education in the United States
can be examined by reviewing the historical development of the different types of
institutions.  Essentially, control of the academic enterprise has shifted from the
individual, to informal groups, to the church, to the government, and now appears
to be shifting again.  Prior to the 16th century, “colleges originated when students
associated together and employed a tutor” (Henderson, 1969, p.1).  Therefore,
colleges were student controlled and student financed.  By the 16th Century, the
practice of chartering colleges as corporations was well established” (Henderson,
1969, p.1).  According to Henderson, institutionalizing the academic enterprise
through chartering colleges was the result of a “church-state rivalry” for the control
of teaching.  Incorporation was the “device used by the state to gain a measure of
supervision and control” (p.1).  In the 16th and 17th centuries, European countries
began establishing state-controlled institutions of higher learning.
Over the past 350 years in the United States, higher education has evolved
through many institutional models: the colonial college, the land grant college, the
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research university, and the metropolitan university.  This evolution has not been
linear.  Some institutions founded more than 350 years ago operate within their
original framework.  Most institutions have shifted or expanded over time in
response to external demands and opportunities.  The remainder of this section
reviews the history of American higher education funding and institutional control
from 1643 to 1998.
Colonial Colleges
Clergy, who appointed the governing boards that implemented the college’s
mission to train men to become ministers, controlled the colonial colleges.
Funding came from the “church, charity, and philanthropy” (Greenleaf, 1930,
p.254).  Seventeenth-century colonial colleges developed from an interest in
civilizing the new frontier through introducing the English higher education system
based on Oxford and Cambridge to the new colonies (Rudolph, 1990).  Nine
colleges were established between 1643 and 1770 (collectively referred to as the
colonial colleges).  These colleges were affiliated both ecclesiastically and
geographically, receiving financial support from the church and from the colonial
governments.  Harvard, the first institution of higher education in the United States,
opened in 1643.
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In 1636 the General Court of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay awarded
400 British pounds and a parcel of land to support the establishment of Harvard
College (Greenleaf, 1930; Rudolph, 1990).  By 1650 Harvard’s original board,
composed of “magistrates and clergy,” requested a charter from the colonial
government as a means of obtaining a board and a faculty with greater professional
expertise (Henderson, 1969).  Consequently, one of the nation’s preeminent private
institutions began as a state-supported institution, but quickly initiated a process to
break away from governmental control to become an independent, private
institution.
In the 18th and 19th centuries, states continued to support private institutions.
In many cases, as a state funded an institution, it also wanted to control the
institution. Columbia was originally established as a public institution known as
Kings College. In 1787 it became part of the New York state system and was
renamed Columbia.  It was given a high level of autonomy and was allowed to
operate virtually as a private institution.  By the 19th century, Columbia was a
completely private institution.  According to Greenleaf (1930), other institutions,
such as the University of Pennsylvania and Dartmouth College, similarly shifted
from public to private funding in order to minimize state control.
From 1770 to 1862, provincial rivalries coupled with federal legislation
contributed to a continued expansion of both public and private colleges (Rudolph,
1990).  With leaders in every state or territory motivated to prove that their region
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was a legitimate part of the United States, new institutions of higher learning
became status symbols.  In 1787 federal legislation known as the Northwest
Ordinance included a policy that “all citizens have the right to” an education,
including a college education (Hathaway, 1995, p.6).  This further energized the
proliferation of institutions of higher learning.  The Northwest Ordinance
established a national effort to support higher learning through government
allocation of resources to support new institutions.
Greenleaf (1930) pointed out that, by the 19th century, states stopped
funding private institutions and began establishing “new public institutions of
higher education under state control” (p.254).  The University of South Carolina
opened as the first state-controlled institution in 1805.  During this same time,
business and professional men were displacing the clergy who had previously
dominated governing boards that oversaw institutions of higher learning
(Henderson, 1969).  As institutions of higher learning became public or were
established as public state-controlled institutions, the members of the boards
elected or assigned to direct the institutions were most often from “the politically
sophisticated or the business-legal segments of society” (Henderson, 1969, p.3).
Henderson notes that the “boards became weighted in favor of the values that
prevailed in American business and politics” (p.3).  Public boards predominantly
comprised of private sector-oriented leaders began guiding public institutions of
higher learning within a business-centered orientation.
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Land Grant Institutions
The Civil War marked the end of the colonial college period and the
emergence of another type of institution, the land grant university.  In 1862, federal
legislation known as the Morrill Land Grant Act was passed to establish one
college in each state.  Publicly held lands were allocated to support institutions of
higher learning in every state.  These land grants not only provided the land on
which to build the institutions, but also were used as cash-producing endowments
to fund their operation (Rudolph, 1990).
In 1865 the state of Massachusetts allocated land to support a new kind of
institution, known as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  MIT was the first
institution established for the purpose of pursuing engineering and the applied
sciences.  Scientific and technical inquiry was used to respond to the practical
needs of an agrarian society.  Consequently, agricultural education became a
significant part of the land grant college model.  Examples of the land grant
university included Texas Agricultural and Mechanical University, Michigan State
University, and the University of Maryland.
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The Research University
With the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society, the role of
science, scientific inquiry and scholarship expanded the academy, creating the next
type of institution, the research university (Rudolph, 1990).  According to Goldin
(1998):
Both the public and private higher education sectors evolved in the
1890–1940 period. Fundamental changes in the creation and
diffusion of knowledge, such as the specialization of disciplines, the
professionalization of many occupations, the secularization of
higher education, the increased role of research, and the ascent of
the "university" form, altered the industrial structure of higher
education (p.304).
Goldin (1998) also noted that in “states having a concentration of economic
activity by industrial-output, mining or oil interests, the public sector invested
heavily in training and research” (p.304).  During the first half of the 20th century,
state support for and student enrollment in public higher education doubled.
Metropolitan Universities
The metropolitan university, the most recent institutional model, evolved
from society’s need to meet 21st century post-industrial knowledge requirements
(Lynton, 1995).  In the early 1980s, a group of academic leaders from 13 urban
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institutions formed a coalition called “the Urban 13.”  The Urban 13 began meeting
regularly to discuss how their institutions were different from all other institutional
models: that is, how they were different from research universities, community
colleges and liberal arts colleges. These 13 urban institutions were the first
metropolitan universities.  By 1996, 54 institutions identified themselves as such
(MacLean, 1996).
Metropolitan universities are very different from research universities.  A
metropolitan university has a “regional orientation and strong commitment to serve
the intellectual needs of its surrounding communities and constituencies,” whereas
research universities tend to serve an entire state or nation (Lynton, 1995, p.xiii).
As a result both financing and institutional control of metropolitan universities are
intimately connected to state, county and city governments (Ramalay, 1997).  Since
the institution is committed to serving a specific metropolitan area, funding sources
available to metropolitan universities include federal grants; university
collaborations with city, county and state agencies; and public-private partnerships.
Given that metropolitan universities are relatively young institutions of higher
learning with small alumni and endowment bases, the reliance on public funding is
significant (Brownell, 1993; Kincaid, 1993).
Changing state government priorities in the 1990s resulted in a decline of
state funding for all public institutions.  A growing body of literature suggested that
the more recent types of institutions, such as metropolitan universities, were even
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more affected by declining state support (Kincaid, 1993).  Of the major categories
of state spending in the 1990s—Medicaid, Aid for Dependent Children, prisons,
K–12 education and higher education—only higher education experienced a
decline in state support.  Support for emerging institutions of higher learning such
as metropolitan universities has been subordinated to other state obligations such as
prisons, entitlements and tax reductions.
A recently emerging funding source for metropolitan universities has been
private funding through philanthropic donations.  Ramaley (1997) noted that
metropolitan universities may lack established donor loyalty and nationally
recognized academic programs, but they have regional appeal and are seen as
providing quality, cost-effective academic programs to local communities.
Ramalay observed that many donors will give to their alma maters and will also
give to a nearby metropolitan university because of the “local impact of the
institution and its economic, cultural and social value to the community” (p.44).
Growth, Control and Funding
Regardless of institutional type, there has been a struggle for control of
higher education through funding.  During the latter part of the 19th century and the
early 20th century, there were many conflicts between state governments and public
colleges and universities (Henderson, 1969; Shelburne, 1939). In 1895 Kansas
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established a public higher education system that was to be free to all who lived in
the state (Shelburne, 1939).  The state charter indicated that only non-residents
should be charged to attend.  However, in order to fund the library, the regents
charged a $5.00 fee, which students had to pay before they could use the facility.
The Kansas attorney general filed a lawsuit against the board of regents in an
attempt to remove the board members.  The court ruled in favor of the attorney
general and indicated that the “regents have no power to raise a fund ... unless
expressly authorized to do so by law” (p.87).  In 1914 a similar case where a
university charged a mandatory fee to students for use of university services
occurred in Oklahoma, but the university prevailed in that case.
In 1931, the Georgia state government placed all public institutions of
higher learning under a single board of regents.  The board attempted to borrow
money from the federal government to fund a series of capital projects.  The money
was to be paid back from fees charged to students.  The State of Georgia filed an
injunction prohibiting the regents from charging the fee.  The government argued
that only the state could charge fees and that the board was acting outside its
constitutional authority. The court found in favor of the board of regents and ruled
that there is a difference between the state’s authority to charge tuition and the
institution’s authority to charge fees.
In the 1920s it was noted that funding of higher education was shifting from
governments to individuals.  For example, “In 1927–28 a larger portion of the
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receipts was collected from students, private benefactions and miscellaneous
sources, while a percentage decrease was noted in funds from all public sources and
endowment income” (Greenleaf, 1930, p.260). That year public higher education
was funded from the following sources: students (18 percent), state or city (54
percent), federal government (8 percent) and endowments (3 percent).  In addition
17 private institutions received funding from state and city sources totaling $4.1
million, 3 percent of all governmental funds allocated to public institutions
(Greenleaf).
In the 1950s there was a concern that public institutions were shifting from
their historically populist structure toward a more private-centered corporate
structure to the detriment of the essential mission of higher education (Carey,
1956).  Carey noted that in the public’s mind there were certain “loosely drawn
similarities between corporations and universities” (1956, p.440).  These
similarities included viewing state taxpayers as stockholders, boards of
trustees/regents as boards of corporate directors, university presidents as general
managers and students and parents as customers.  Carey referred to this as a
“corporation complex.”  He argued that the corporate paradigm would cause “the
university to supplant some of its pedagogical objectives with business objectives,
[and] probably there will be an overemphasis on economic profits at the expense of
educational values” (p.441).  In the corporate paradigm, numbers of students
become more important than the creation and dissemination of knowledge.  Carey
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predicted that the corporate complex would create a circular framework of “getting
more students, to get more state funds to get more buildings to get more students, to
get more funds” (p.441).  In considering the corporate construct, Carey asked the
question of whether faculty were “state employees” or “appointees to an academic
community” (p.443).  He viewed the corporate “employee” paradigm as lacking
flexibility and independence of thought, which might render faculty unable to
conduct research or teach:
The faculty member may thus become a routine functionary rather
than an educator with a high purpose—that of fertilizing and feeding
minds in order that we, or the next generation, may learn better ways
of doing the things we must do if we are to have a better life (p.444).
The Truman Commission on Higher Education
In 1946 President Harry Truman established the President’s Commission on
Higher Education.  In December 1947 the commission completed a 377-page report
which predicted that there would be an enormous demand for higher education by
1960.  The report was considered unprecedented in that it aggressively outlined the
importance of educating significant numbers of citizens as a prerequisite for
maintaining democracy and ensuring a quality of life for the nation (Russell, 1949;
Simpson, 1948).  This report considered governmental funding of higher education
an investment in human capital.  It articulated the need for additional state and
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federal financing of higher education in order to advance economic, social and
national agendas.
The report predicted that between 1947 and 1960, twice as many citizens,
4.6 million as compared with the 1946 enrollment of 2.3 million, would be
attending college.  The report noted that, given the anticipated increases in
enrollment, the states were not fiscally equipped to absorb the total burden.  The
Truman Commission reported that the federal government was in the best position
to fund its recommendations.  The report indicated that “all of those responsible for
higher education—individuals, communities, States and the Nation—should bear
an equitable share of the financial burden” (Simpson, 1948).  The report also
recommended that as states increased their funding of public higher education
“state education departments should be strengthened and given centralized
authority over higher education. ...”(Russell, 1949)
In order to meet that demand, the Truman Commission recommended a six-
point plan to establish an expansive federal system of financial aid that would be
directly awarded to students.  Simpson (1948) notes that this commission believed
the student should “participate” in paying for a portion of the cost of her/his
education.  Other recommendations included a financing plan in which the states
financed instructional costs, the federal government funded the capital costs, and
the students contributed a small percentage of the overall cost.  The report argued
that state commitment to education should expand funding of the freshmen and
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sophomore years of college so that it would be equivalent to funding grades 13 and
14.
H. K. Newburn (1950), a Truman Commission member, expressed a
university president’s perspective on the future funding of higher education.
Newburn linked maintaining the democracy to future funding of higher education:
“The ultimate determining factor in a full realization of our democratic ideals is the
extent to which every citizen is educated to accept his responsibilities in our
society” (p.177).  Newburn acknowledged many historical barriers that kept
individuals from becoming fully educated, including religion, family history of
attending college, gender and race, but he believed financial barriers might be the
last great challenge:
If the people of this nation are to commit themselves, as appears
likely, to provide education for each individual to the extent that his
abilities and efforts justify it, they must at the same time be required
to commit themselves to paying the price necessary for the success
of such a noble idea.  To do otherwise would be to make mockery of
our efforts and to doom in advance our attempts to make our nation
strong through the development of men and women prepared to live
in a free society (Newburn, 1950, p.184).
Newburn (1950) indicated that although it is unlikely that the cost of
education can be reduced, the “proportion of costs borne by the individual” (p.178)
must be reduced.  With an expectation that from 1950 to1960 student enrollment
would double and that costs would significantly increase, Newburn recommended
that the private sector and government (state and federal) develop a “fully
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coordinated pattern of scholarships and fellowships” (p.179).  Newburn also
pointed out that there was disagreement within the Truman Commission regarding
the distribution of governmental grants and scholarships to private institutions of
higher learning.  Most of the commission members supported limiting
governmental support to only public institutions, but a dissenting opinion was
included in the report.
1998 National Commission on the Cost of Higher Education
In 1998, 50 years after the Truman Commission, another national attempt to
define who should pay for higher education was released in the National
Commission on the Cost of Higher Education Report, Straight Talk About College
Costs and Prices (Troutt, 1998). The report was the culmination of a project
commissioned by President Clinton in 1996 to study the cost of higher education.
The original purpose of the commission, as outlined in Public Law 105-18, was to
“create a bipartisan commission to study the rising cost of a higher education and
find ways to make college more affordable” (Burd, 1997, p.A37).  The commission
was asked to study the effect federal student financial aid has on cost and determine
whether public and private colleges are “making serious efforts to control their
expenditures” (ibid).  The commission was also asked to study whether the federal
government could do anything to reduce college costs (ibid).
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The elements that led to forming the commission included Republican
lawmakers who wanted to “make good on their vow to look into the rising costs of
college” (Burd, 1996, p.A27).  As a part of the work to reauthorize the Higher
Education Act, congressional lawmakers held hearings in response to the “cost
issue.”  According to Burd, Republican congressional leaders were interested in
considering whether student financial aid drove up the cost of college, whereas
educators welcomed a review of college costs as an opportunity to discuss how
government controls contributed to the cost of higher education.
According to the report, funding of public higher education comes from
three major sources: government, students/families and institutions themselves.
Historically, the largest contributor to public higher education has been the state
(Bowen, 1981).  However, state contributions have declined over the past 30 years,
and in some cases student tuition and fees have become proportionally the larger
funding source for institutional operations (Troutt, 1998).  State appropriations
have become a secondary or tertiary contributor.  Students fund higher education
each semester through tuition and fees.  Colleges and universities acquire an
increasing amount of revenue from non-state sources, including grants, outsourcing
and direct sale of services and goods (Breneman, 1997; Goldstein, 1993).  The
federal government has historically contributed the least to higher education in
terms of direct appropriated funds, but has chosen to affect higher education
through direct aid to students in the form of grants and loans (St. John, 1994).
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The National Commission’s report made numerous recommendations,
which were divided into five action agendas:
• Strengthen institutional cost control.
• Improve market information and public accountability.
• Deregulate higher education.
• Rethink accreditation.
• Enhance and simplify federal student aid.
As a preface to these agendas, the report presents several themes (Troutt, 1998,
p.4), including the following:
• This country has a world-class higher education system.
• There is a connection between quality post-secondary education and
economic success.
• Higher education at its present cost is still an “extraordinary value.”
• Quality and cost are a “shared responsibility” among “institutions,
families, students and other patrons.”
• “Tuition price controls” would destroy quality.
• “Academic institutions have permitted a veil of obscurity to settle over
their financial operations.”
If higher education does not take the lead in responding to problems of cost and
accountability, then state and federal finance policy may be established to regulate
the academy. The 1998 National Commission report presented significant concepts
that continue to shape a national discussion for the future of financing higher
education.
One of the most important concepts from this report related to how higher
education was organized and funded.  This topic was extensively addressed in an
expert paper located in the appendix of the report.  The paper presented by Gordon
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Winston (1997) reviewed the economic structure of the typical university in
relation to the typical economic structure of a private firm.  Winston contended that
the economic structure of a university operates in a manner contrary to that of a
private firm.
The most significant difference between higher education and the private
sector, according to Winston (1997), is that all institutions of higher education sell
their product, education, at a subsidized price that is “far less than the average cost
of its production” (p.117).  Winston advanced a critically important concept that
private firms price their product based on the cost of the product plus profit,
whereas higher education institutions set their price less than cost because of a
student subsidy.  The following represents Winston’s position:
Private Firm
Price = Cost + Profit
Institution of Higher Learning
      Price + Subsidy = Cost      Or       Price = Cost - Subsidy
Winston continues that our entire society has developed what he calls an
“intuition” about how organizations should operate based upon the economics of
the private firm.  Consequently, popular notions regarding the price of higher
education have assumed that increased cost of attending college is a function of
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increased cost or increased profit taking of some sort.  As a result of this belief,
there have been political efforts to dissect and re-engineer cost in order to ascertain
how to reduce the price charged to students.  However in Winston’s model, the
increased price of public higher education may also result from a decrease in
student subsidy, i.e. a decrease in state support.  The economics of higher education
are counter-intuitive to a business paradigm.  This difference has been a major
barrier to accurately understanding the pricing of higher education.
The Truman Commission report focused on achieving enrollment expansion,
whereas The National Cost Commission report focused on achieving cost
containment.  Both commissions, in their time, ignited a national discussion
regarding college access, equity, cost, price and subsidy.  Both commissions
attempted to learn from the past and prepare the country for future educational
demands.
This historical review outlining the financial and regulatory patterns of
institutions of higher education was intended to provide a foundation of
information from which to consider future patterns.  Since the founding of Harvard
in 1643, institutions of higher learning in the United States have grown from one in
every colony to one in almost every county, and from nine to more than 3,700.
Regardless of this growth, issues of control and funding have pervaded the 350-
year history of higher education in the United States.
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State Financing of Higher Education
Higher education has a societal mission, to educate all who want to pursue
an education beyond high school.  Given the country’s historically populist
approach toward postsecondary education, the distribution of the cost of higher
education has been critical to student access (Brown, 2002; Brubacher, 1976;
Lennington, 1996).  According to a 1996 report from the U. S. Department of
Education, “The cost of higher education to students has a direct impact on access,
so that increases in cost are understandably of great concern to students, parents,
and education policy makers” (Lennington, 1996, p.3).
I think it is coming full cycle. When I was young only the rich went
to college. It is coming around to the same thing.  Even with state
colleges, the tuitions are going up and up and up.  It will come
around to only the rich being able to afford to go to college. (Focus
Group Participant, Harvey, 1994, p.23)
This populist approach toward higher education has resulted in a demographic
profile of college students increasingly reflecting the demographic profile of our
society.  There is a constant debate about whether declines in state subsidies will
adversely affect access to higher education.
Economists look at the relationship between direct fees (what the student
pays) and taxation (what the community pays) in terms of balancing who should
pay and how much.  As Creedy (1994) questioned, “Under what circumstances
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would a majority of individuals be prepared to vote for a proportion of the cost of
higher education per person to be met from tax revenue, given that the majority will
not find it worthwhile to invest in education? (p.6)”  It appeared that many students
and many economists view higher education as more of a personal benefit than a
public good.
St. John (1994) presented an ideological framework that attempted to
explain the variety of viewpoints regarding funding higher education.  According to
St. John, the dominant political belief system is the ideology that shapes the
direction of public policy.  He broke down belief systems into five categories:
conservative, liberal, neoconservative, neoliberal and neo-marxist.  The following
summary outlines each ideological perspective connected to higher education
funding (St. John, p.6):
Conservative:
Returns from public investment accrue primarily to individuals.
Liberal:
Economic development and intergenerational equity provide bases
for public investment.
Neoconservative:
Student aid has no influence on access.
Institutions raise tuition to increase revenue from federal aid
programs.
Institutions raise tuition to maximize revenue (greed).
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Institutions raise tuition because they are nonproductive.
Poor academic achievement explains lower participation by African
Americans.
Neoliberal:
Institutions replace the loss of federal student aid dollars with their
own aid dollars, which influences tuition increases.
Reductions in state subsidies to institutions fuel tuition increases.
Tax revenue returns provide a basis for public investment.
Neo-Marxist:
Low income and minority students are generally influenced by the
entire cost controversy.
Programs serving middle-class majors are more adversely
influenced by budget decisions that serve elite professions.
Understanding the continuum of ideological perspectives contributes to
understanding the political and ideological context that shapes higher education
fiscal policy.  Ideological perspectives are the foundation from which political and
educational leaders negotiate the cost, subsidy and price of public higher education.
The more conservative the ideology, the more reduced the government subsidy,
which results in a higher price to the student.
The Higher Education Franchise
As a result of the debate on who benefits and who pays for higher
education, a public perception has formed that the entire higher education franchise
costs too much, regardless of who pays.  Mullen (1988) believed that “there is a
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general confusion about the relationship between the quality of education and its
cost, both in the general public and within the higher education community” (p.10).
St. John goes further and indicates that there is a crisis in higher education
financing because of the perceptions or misperceptions of government spending,
including the appropriations for public higher education.  During the 1980s higher
education tuition rose sharply.  This led to public criticism that increases in tuition
must be caused by some type of waste or mismanagement.  In fact, actual federal
and state support of higher education declined, enrollments were in decline
nationally and institutions were still recovering from the effects of a period of high
inflation in the late 1970s and the early 1980s.  These economic factors are not
commonly considered when explaining cost increases.
With the public’s tendency to mistrust government, including higher
education institutions, there has been a perception that colleges and universities are
wasting, or not optimally spending, public funds (Brown 2002). This suspicion
questions the validity of a higher education.  McPherson (1991) noted that
productivity has not increased in higher education because the “basic production
functions” have remained unchanged.  Faculty and administrators have few
incentives to become more productive because faculty are rewarded for
“productivity in research and not in teaching [,] and administrators are rewarded for
number of staff and programs managed with often little attention about their
productivity or efficiency” (McPherson, p9).
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No consistent approach has guided higher education through the challenges
of the past 30 years.  On one hand, Lennington (1996) warned “unless higher
education aligns itself as a business and appoints management personnel,
identifying them as managers rather than administrators, costs will continue to
escalate as they do in government.  Higher education will be available only to a
wealthy minority” (Lennington, p164).  On the other hand, Block (1995) believed
the problem is that higher education is run too much like a business.  Block
believed that higher education, as a business endeavor, does not serve students
well.  He argued that higher education needs to move away from the business
model and become more service-oriented.  Block says that colleges and universities
have to work on both the way they are governed and the way learning is delivered
in order to become more learner-centered organizations.
Governmental Funding of Higher Education
For more than 100 years, public higher education in the United States has
followed a governmental policy, which provides the following:
Direct appropriations to public institutions to allow those institutions
to charge tuition for all students that [is] low in absolute terms.  The
resulting charges are also, importantly, low relative to the cost of
providing education services at these institutions, and low relative to
charges by comparable private institutions (Fischer, 1990, p.44).
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Fischer (1990) outlined several factors that have shaped this public policy,
including the following:
• Higher education is a public good that should be free or very accessible.
• A better-educated community is a benefit to society, thus public higher
education deserves the same financial support that is allocated to public
elementary or secondary education.
• Higher education is an entitlement as is public school education.
• An affordable higher education is a way to keep talented people in a state
or,
with low cost out-of-state tuition, a way to recruit bright college-oriented
people to a state.
• Higher education is a way to promote equal opportunity for students from
low-income families.
Changes in the historical patterns of governmental funding of higher
education threaten future access to higher education (Halstead, 1993; McPherson
and Shapiro, 2001).  In the 1993 introduction to his report State Profiles: Financing
Public Higher Education 1978 to 1993, Halstead summarized the situation that has
continued into the 21st century:
Governors and state legislators strive to allocate scarce revenues among
competing public claims.  Education officials seek to project and promote
realistic budgets, which equitably and productively distribute appropriated
support.  Institutional administrators and faculty pursue academic
excellence and competitive salaries.  Students and parents desire a quality
education at the lowest possible cost.  And finally, taxpayers seek
efficiently operated government services adequate to public needs (p.10).
Who pays for higher education has steadily shifted away from government (the
society) to the individual (the student).  Blasdell, McPherson and Shapiro (1993)
determined that public institutions historically received primary support from state
appropriations and that these appropriations are in decline.  They further indicated
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that “universities are going to have to gain an increased share of their revenues
from other sources” (p.31). Callan (2003) not only confirms that state support for
public higher education has continued to decline but also predicts that further cuts
in state support are likely.
Over the past 30 years, students have paid significantly more for their
education.  From an annual survey of colleges, the College Board (2002) provided
college cost trend data for 1971–2002.  The College Board research indicated that,
in constant dollars, students paid more than twice as much for their education in
2002 than they paid in 1971.  The cost to attend public four-year institutions
increased from $1,577 per year in 1971–72 to $4,081 per year in 2002–2003.
The 30 year study was consistent with a 1996 report conducted by the
Department of Education, which indicated that in the 1960s, students attending
public colleges and universities paid approximately 10 percent of the total cost of
their education, compared to the 1970s when they paid 33 percent of the cost.  In
the 1990s students paid over 40 percent of the cost.  Tuition and fees on the average
grew 3.1 percent to 5.6 percent per year from 1980 to 1990, and increased an
average of 3.9 percent per year from 1990 to 2000.  However, median family
income did not increase as fast (in constant dollars), which actually resulted in a
loss in buying power (National Center for Education Statistics, May 1996; June
2003).
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Higher education researchers Kent Halstead (1998) and Thomas Mortenson
(1999) found that the prices students pay have increased over time.  However,
when they took inflation into account, they found that institutional operating costs
had not increased. The decline in the proportion of state appropriations to public
higher education’s total budget was the primary reason that the increase in the price
students pay exceeded inflation (Halstead, 1993).  A 1997 report by the American
Council on Education (ACE) substantiated Halstead’s 1993 observation.  The ACE
(1997) described seven factors that contributed to price increases, even though
higher education was initiating cost containment measures.  Those seven factors
were:
• Economic market conditions that limit productivity and the market’s ability
to increase cost.
• State budget cuts to public higher education.
• Institutionally funded need-based financial aid.
• Student expectations for quality.
• Institutional scientific and technical needs.
• Cost of regulatory compliance.
• Minimum wage increases.
Critics of higher education attempt to explain the current fiscal dilemma as
a lack of organizational efficiency or productivity.  Lennington (1996) believes that
public higher education should organize itself more like a private-sector business
than a public-state agency.  He attributes most of the increases in the price of higher
education to 10 major cost centers that are much less efficient in the public sector
than in the business sector.  These categories include human resources, capital
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expenses and operating costs.  The cost of faculty salaries and instructional support
for faculty is the largest single cost factor.  Increases in this item have directly
contributed to increases in tuition.  These increases are exacerbated by a trend
toward reduced teaching loads, higher salaries and smaller class sizes (Brown,
2002).
Other significant human expense categories include fringe benefits and
expanding administrative costs (Lennington, 1996).  The quality of fringe benefits
associated with institutions of higher learning has historically been more generous
than in the private sector.  This is particularly the case for lower level employees.
As such, fringe benefits may be more costly in the public sector than with private
sector because of unfunded state mandates, which are not linked to productivity.
Administrative units have a tendency to add staff positions rather than cutting costs
as in private or more competitive sectors.
Capital expenditures have increasingly become financial burdens for
colleges and universities (Brown, 2002; Lennington, 1996).  The debt service for
new buildings or refinanced debt for existing obligations has become a major
institutional cost factor.  Additionally, facilities built following World War II and
in the early 1970s are now aging and require extensive maintenance and repair.
Finally, significant operating costs can include supporting research,
expansion of student services, development of auxiliary enterprises and funding of
institutional reserves and contingency funds (Brown, 2002; Lennington, 1996).
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Funding research shifts tuition dollars away from the teaching function to equip
and maintain research enterprises.  The proliferation and specialization of student
services to meet student demands, often utilizing educational professionals, have
contributed to increasing costs.  Auxiliary enterprise units can be costly even
though they are designed to be fiscally self-sufficient.  As a final point, maintaining
reserve and contingency funds can be challenging when most bureaucracies are
constantly managing competing needs for limited resources.
Paying for Higher Education
Payment for higher education historically has been divided between the
student and the government.  Regardless of who pays, the actual price of higher
education should be communicated and explained more effectively (Mullen 1988;
Troutt, 1998).  Mullen and the Cost Commission (Troutt, 1998) both indicated that
all stakeholders should commonly understand the percentage of the total cost each
entity actually pays.  Awareness of who pays and to what extent is key to
developing effective higher education funding policy.
As students have had to pay more for their education, more of them are
working to earn money to pay their increasing share.  An outcome of this trend has
been an increase in the time students take to complete their education.  A 1996
report of the University of Texas System indicated that “students currently seem to
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rely more than earlier student cohorts on earnings from full-time or part-time
employment, a phenomenon which apparently contributes to delays in completing
degree programs.  At minimum wages, earning potential is quite low compared to
students’ costs” (University of Texas System, p.2).  Regardless of such findings,
there appears to be a continued momentum to shift cost away from government to
students.
McPherson (1991) believes that more students should pay a larger part of
the cost of their education.  He bases this conclusion on all of the other financial
commitments and public pressures that states face, including prisons, police, roads,
public elementary and secondary education, public health and other state priorities.
As such, states should reconsider their role in supporting higher education.  Higher
education reform would include a financing system requiring affluent students to
pay more, with low- and middle-income students proportionally assisted through a
federal student aid program based on economic need.
States have historically paid the largest proportion of the cost of public
higher education.  However, this portion has declined over the past 73 years. Table
2.1 presents a pattern of funding by source from 1927 to 2000.
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Table 2.1: Percentage Funding of Higher Education by Source: 1927–2000
1927 1967 1996 2000
      Percent of  Total Share Percent of Total Share                     Percent of Total Share         Percent of Total
Share
Student 18% 12% 22% 18%
Institution 20% 23% 27% 36%
State
Government 54% 44% 40% 34%
Federal
Government 8% 21% 10% 12%
Source: Greenleaf (1930); CASPAR (1999); NCES (2003)
Since 1998 it appears that public higher education might have benefited
from the economic boom of the latter part of the 20th century.  According to
McKeown-Moak (2000), “for the first time in 15 years, no states reported
reductions in state appropriations for higher education from one year to the next,
and only Wyoming, which is in the second year of a biennial budget, reported no
increase” (p.2)  (McKeown-Moak, 2000). These increases in state funding of higher
education were not a shift toward increased state support of higher education, but
were a byproduct of increases in personal income
(Mortenson, 1999).
  Today, public institutions of higher learning in this early part of the 2000s
are experiencing reductions in state funding.  This same pattern of “downward
investment” also occurred in the early part of the 1980s and the 1990s (Mortenson,
2002, p. 1).  As a result of the reduction in state support, the price to students
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increased to offset the losses in state funding. This reduction in state support and
increasing price to students can be explained by the notion of higher education as a
balance wheel. Hovey (1999) uses this concept to describe where states use higher
education as a way to balance state finances. When state funds are abundant, states
tend to allocate more funds to higher education. When state funds are short, states
can disproportionately reduce the level of support to public higher education
compared to other state supported activities in order to balance their budgets.
Legislators believe public higher education makes a good balance wheel because it
has other funding sources it can turn to, such as tuition, to absorb cuts in state
support. They also believe public institutions have reserves and an ability to absorb
short term fiscal stress through such actions as increases in class sizes and/or
teaching loads.
Public higher education is perceived to have more funding options than
other state entities.  According to Marcus (1995),
... higher education is usually the biggest piece of the discretionary
portion
of a state’s budget and is thus easiest to cut.  Since education
appears to have "an independent source of revenue: tuition and
fees,” it is all that more an attractive item to reduce (p.11).
As a result of declining state support, “tuition and fee income has increased
as a source of revenue in most types of higher education institutions" (U. S.
Department Report, 1996, p.6).  Lennington (1996) observed that fees have
significantly increased as an offset to the decline in tax subsidies.
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State funding patterns differ by regions of the country. The western and
southern states have historically adopted “a policy that general tax revenues should
be used to keep the costs of participating in higher education as low as possible”
(Fischer, 1990; Mullen 1998). This is known as the low-cost, low-aid approach.
The northern and eastern states have adopted a different approach with fewer
general revenue tax dollars allocated. Higher education, in these states, has adopted
a practice of charging higher tuition but then reallocating a percentage of tuition
back to students who are financially less able to afford higher education.  This
approach is called high-cost, high-aid (Creedy, 1994; McPherson, 1991; Mullen,
1998).
College Board (2000) report indicated that regionally New England had the
highest tuition; whereas the western region had the lowest (see Table 2.2).  These
historical regional patterns may be shifting.  The College Board notes that from
1990 to 2000, there have been substantial regional differences in the rate of
increase in tuition at public four-year institutions.
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$2,332 $3,510 $1,178 51%
New England  3,287   4,748   1,461 44
Middle States  2,682   4,686   2,004 75
South  2,325   2,906      581 25
Midwest  2,748   3,992   1,244 45
Southwest  1,516   2,925   1,409 93
West  1,802   2,747      945 53
Source: The College Board (2000)
Higher Education Finance Research Sources
One of the leading sources for monitoring the decline in state funding of
public higher education is the Mortenson Research Seminar on Public Policy
Analysis of Opportunity for Postsecondary Education.  Mortenson (2002) noted
that in the state tax appropriations for fiscal year 2002-2003, states continued a
renewed trend of reducing state support.  Three years earlier, in 1999 Mortenson
noted increases in state funding but cautioned that these increases did not reflect a
renewed commitment to public higher education, but instead should be considered
a result of increases in personal income and the general growth of the economy.
Mortenson stated that “... over a longer period of time, these increases are nothing
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more than a modest pause in a trend of significant declines in state investment in
higher education that began about FY1980” (1998, p.1).
Appropriations of state tax funds for public higher education operating
expenses per $1,000 of personal income were at their peak in 1979 at $11.22, while
the 2002-2003 fiscal year state investment of  $7.35 is at the lowest since 1967
(Mortenson, 2002). Public institutions of higher learning have changed their
institutional structures as a result of the declines in state investment.  Mortenson
(1999) explains that institutions have taken three primary approaches in response to
the declines in state funding:
• Capacity: Controlling enrollment with caps and increased admissions
standards.
• Quality: Reducing quality of instruction by increasing class size, paying
below market rates for faculty.
• Affordability: Passing the reduction in state funds on to students as price
increases.
As shown earlier in this chapter, another nationally recognized source for
analyzing the states’ fiscal relationship with higher education is Kent Halstead.
Annually, Halstead’s Research Associates of Washington analyze the social,
political, and environmental factors that affect state investment in higher education.
Halstead’s model is designed to evaluate the states’ “capacity, public actions, and
achievement” (1996, p.2).  The work is not designed to be predictive but is
intended to present “measurable variables and their current and past inter-working
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in establishing funding levels” (p.5). Unfortunately, the last year that the analysis
was done was 1996.
Halstead’s work is developed from work conducted in the late 1950s and
1960s that attempted to quantify state governments' historical support for higher
education (Timm, 1971).  Prior to Halstead, other researchers developed
methodologies to track higher education financing.  These researchers—for
example, Henry Frank and Drews Martin—developed state indexes in an attempt to
objectively compare state contributions to higher education in relation to specific
variables.  These variables included population enrolled in higher education,
personal income per capita, state allocations to higher education per capita, and the
allocation to higher education as a percent of state/local income.
State Control of Higher Education
The other major area of review involves state regulation of higher
education.  Since 1983 J. F. Volkwein has studied the relationships between
institutional autonomy, state control (that is, the lack of institutional autonomy) and
the quality and productivity of public higher education.  Volkwein (1987) notes that
public higher education’s “regulatory relationship with state governments forms a
critical component of the external climate within which these institutions pursue
their goals” (p.120).  In 1983 Volkwein (p.514) introduced two measures to
50
determine the level of state control: fiscal flexibility and academic flexibility. Fiscal
flexibility consisted of nine items (Volkwein, 1983):
• Lump sum versus line item budgeting.
• Institutional ability to shift funds among categories.
• Institutional ability to retain and control tuition revenues.
• Institutional ability to retain and control other revenues.
• External ceilings for faculty positions.
• External ceilings for other employee positions
• Freedom from pre-audit of expenditures.
• Institutional ability to carry over year-end balances.
• Institutional ability to issue own checks for payroll and purchases.
Academic flexibility was based on six items taken from a 1982 Carnegie
Foundation.  The items included an institution’s ability to:
• Define its own mission.
• Add new undergraduate programs.
• Add new graduate programs.
• Review/discontinue existing undergraduate programs.
• Review/discontinue existing graduate programs.
• Add/discontinue departments.
Volkwein noted that these measures do not significantly vary across institutions
within a state and therefore, the findings were aggregated by state and attributed to
all institutions regardless of type.
In a follow-up article, Volkwein and Malik (1997) reexamined the
relationship between state regulation and institutional effectiveness.  They found
that academic flexibility and fiscal/administrative flexibility are “relatively
independent dimensions of campus autonomy” (p.37).  This study examined
changes between the original 1983 data and data collected in 1995.  The authors
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found that “campuses in many states [had] gained increased flexibility in their
academic, financial and personnel transactions” (p.38).  The authors noted that
increased flexibility might have resulted as compensation for decreased state
support to public institutions.
Volkwein and Malik (1997) found that “state oversight and control
practices for public universities are rather idiosyncratic” (p.38).  The study was not
able to link institutional characteristics or state attributes to any patterns of state
control of public higher education.  On the other hand, the authors did determine
that a significant relationship existed between faculty quality and student quality,
which were influenced by institutional size and state financial support.
Volkwein and Malik (1998) examined the extent to which state regulation
of higher education contributes to campus leader satisfaction.  They hypothesized
that “state controls have a negative impact on administrative satisfaction” (p.44).
They created a database from several sources, including the Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System, the National Research Council’s study of
doctoral programs, and popular publications such as Barron’s, U. S. News & World
Report, and collegiate guidebooks.  The study analyzed 144 Carnegie classified





• Managerial Satisfaction, Stress and Work Climate
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The study found that many of the variables were not significantly related.
One variable that was significantly related to institutional autonomy and flexibility
measures was state regulation.  Perceived external regulation was significantly
related to perceptions of work environment.  However, regulation measures were
not significantly related to measures of satisfaction.
Recently, states have employed a variety of regulatory policies to control
public institutions including “imposing tuition freezes, reducing tuition levels,
[and] placing restrictions on the rate of increase in tuition” (McKeown-Moak,
2000, p.8).  The states that experienced legislative regulation in 1999 included
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin.  In Kentucky, Massachusetts and Virginia
increased state regulation during the 1990s was accompanied by increased state
funding.  McKeown-Moak contends that performance-based funding has been or is
under consideration in over half of the states.  States are also considering other
types of regulation including “examining workload and productivity as a means of
improving learning outcomes or decreasing expenditures” (p.16).
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Privatization of Higher Education
The causes, effects and future consequences of the decline in state funding
of public higher education increasingly could be considered as the de facto
privatization of public higher education.  Researchers and policy makers have
created language to reflect the privatization of higher education.  Institutional
autonomy, independent-public, public-private, state supported, state-assisted, state-
located and deregulated are various ways privatization has been described
(Breneman & Finney, 1997; Callan, 1997; Callan, 2002; Dolence, 1995;
MacTaggert, 1998; Zemsky, 1997).
Privatization whether viewed as opportunity or catastrophe is attributed to
the decline in state funding.  James Duderstadt, former president of University of
Michigan, indicated that as a result of declining state support flagship institutions
might choose to trade state funding for greater autonomy in order to be successful
(Gose, 2002). Pursuing other funding sources such as private gifts, transferring new
technologies from research to the marketplace, and setting tuition to market rates
might be more productive than chasing limited state appropriations.
Breneman and Finney (1997) presented the idea that the result of  “...
reduced state support, coupled with steep increases in tuition and student loan
burdens, has resulted in a significant shift from public to private support of higher
education” (p.30).  They specifically indicated that fiscal year 1993–1994 was
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critical because the primary funding source for public four-year institutions shifted
from states to students and their parents.  The National Cost Commission report
indicated that “virtually no activity, other than self-supporting auxiliary enterprises
such as dormitories and cafeterias, generates enough revenue to pay for itself.
Everything is subsidized to a greater or lesser extent, either through tax revenues,
endowment income, or private giving” (Troutt, 1998, p.17).
Privatization, according to Zemsky, Wegner and Iannozzi (1997, p.75) is
the result of a variety of governmental policies, which may include the following:
•  The conscious decision on the part of government to transfer to private
management the responsibility for certain functions that had formerly been
organized and carried out by public agencies.
• The phenomenon that results from a government’s inability to fund its agencies
at previous levels, often implicitly transferring a greater degree of authority and
initiative to individual agencies or institutions, while continuing to vest nominal
control in government.
• The initiative taken by public agencies and by institutions to reduce cost by
outsourcing functions and/or to increase revenues by raising the prices they
charge for the services they deliver.
• The actions that proceed from a public perception that government itself has
become cumbersome and inefficient, that taxation is excessive and tax dollars
are not well spent, and that government should exert a smaller influence in
public and private life.
Public universities and colleges have been directly affected by these state
privatization policies.
Roherty (1997) observed that one reason higher education has been prone to
state defunding was higher education’s ability to generate funds from a wide range
of sources.  Most other state services/programs were unable to generate funds in the
same manner.  Higher education’s ability to shift costs to students contributes to the
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cycle of reductions in state support.  According to Breneman and Finney (1997), “if
the share of funding by source had remained constant at 1980 levels, tuition could
have been 30 percent lower than it was at the end of 1995” (p.37). As mentioned
previously, this issue has also been discussed by Hovey (1999).
Mortenson (1999) described the historical funding patterns of state
investment in public higher education since 1975, and projects the year each state
will stop funding higher education using a simple regression formula.  Based on
Mortenson’s fiscal year 2000 national analysis, the median year that state funding
of higher education nationwide will go to zero in 2054.  According to Mortenson’s
1999 calculations, Vermont would be the first to completely stop funding in the
year 2015, while New Mexico would continue funding through the year 7119.
Gumport and Jennings (1999) analyzed national financial data and
determined that revenue generated by institutions from private non-governmental
sources has increased relative to state revenues.  They expressed a concern that the
more private sources support public institutions of higher learning, the more higher
education will be “reconceptualized as a private rather than a public good” (p.1).
Their research speaks to the work conducted by Howard Bowen 20 years earlier
when he questioned who should pay for higher education—the individual learner or
society.  Gumport and Jennings also found that “public and private institutions are
beginning to depend on a more similar revenue mix” (p.13).
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A consequence of the continued privatization of public higher education is
the possibility of complete divestiture from the state.  Zemsky and Wegner (1997)
indicated that “some highly regarded public institutions may seek to 'privatize' in
order to preserve what is most important to themselves” (p.63).  According to
Gumport and Jennings (1999), Public Research I universities are the most likely
institutions to become fiscally independent from the state.
Transformation of sections of universities or entire institutions from public
to private is occurring across the country (Selingo, 2003a).  Public institutions that
provide specialized programs such as health sciences, technology, law, business
and art have been some of the first to convert from public to some type of private
institution of higher learning (Schmidt, 2002).  Oregon in 1992 transformed the
Oregon Health Sciences University from a public university to what is called a
state-assisted public corporation.  Ten years later, Oregon is again considering
transforming the Oregon Institute of Technology, a public institution of higher
learning, into a completely private institution. Most recently, the Governor of
Massachusetts announced a plan to privatize three public colleges and to reorganize
the University of Massachusetts Amherst into an independent public-private
university (Selingo, 2003b). Wisconsin president Lyall has proposed that “…the
state turn over its 26 campuses to an independent authority…(Selingo, 2003a, p.
A22)” in order to more effectively manage the institution.
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In addition to institutional transformation, there are other less radical
approaches under consideration that could move public institutions toward
privatization (Selingo, 2003a). Colorado is considering a voucher system whereby
students would directly receive state appropriations rather than state institutions.
Institutions in South Carolina have made public an interest in breaking away from
the control of the state higher education coordinating agency in order to more
effectively pursue public-private partnerships.
With the sudden and extreme budget challenges faced by states, both state
government and higher education leaders may view privatizing public higher
education as good public policy (Selingo, 2003a). Trading greater autonomy for
less funding may become attractive particularly if there is a sense that declining
state support is inevitable and increasing state regulation is unproductive.
Summary
This review suggests that a struggle between government, individuals and
institutions concerning who controls and who funds public higher education has
been underway since the founding of Harvard University almost 400 years ago.
The key factors that contribute to this struggle can be defined by the major funding
sources that support higher education, including student tuition and fees, state
appropriations and institutionally-generated funds.  Historically, states have
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contributed the majority of funding; however, over the past 30 years, changes in
state capacity and commitment have resulted in changes in state support.  Based on
this literature review, Chapter III will present the study’s methodology, which
extends the work of Volkwein, Mortenson and Halstead in a manner that has





This chapter includes the hypotheses and research problems that were
designed to examine the intersection between the works of Kent Halstead, Tom
Mortenson, Patricia Gumport and FredericksVolkwein.  Halstead, Mortenson and
Gumport focus on post-secondary financing trends, whereas a dominant theme of
Volkwein’s work has been institutional autonomy.  This study analyzed the control
and financing of higher education together in order to create a new model to
explain and predict the likelihood of privatization of public institutions of higher
learning.
The purpose of this research was to propose a framework to describe and
predict institutional privatization by examining the changes in state control and
state financial support of institutions of higher learning over nearly 30 years
(1967–1996) in order to predict the likelihood of future changes.  Institutional
privatization was defined in Chapter I as the cumulative result of a shift in primary
funding sources from state appropriated funds to non-governmental funds over time
to meet the current operating expenses of an institution.
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Figure 3.1 shows a conceptual model intended to describe and predict the
future likelihood of privatization.
Figure 3.1: A Conceptual Model for the Privatization of Public Higher Education
Control  + Finance  = Likelihood of Privatization
Population/Sample
The population for this study included all public institutions granting
baccalaureate and higher degrees that had completed the Department of
Education’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Institutional
Characteristic and Financial surveys between 1967 and 1996.  From 1986 to1996,
the NCES data were reported through the Integrated Postsecondary Educational
Data System (IPEDS).  From 1967 to 1986, the data were reported through the
Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS).  Both data sets were
accessed through the National Science Foundation’s web-based Computer-Aided
Science Policy Analysis and Research database system known as CASPAR, which
is accessible at the Web site, http://www.caspar.nsf.gov/webcaspar.  The CASPAR
database system is a statistical system that includes extensive multi-year higher-
education statistics.
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CASPAR data are drawn from a number of sources including data
from surveys of universities and colleges conducted by SRS1, by
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) through its HEGIS
and IPEDS data systems, and from the National Research Council
(NRC) Doctorate Records File and summary data derived from the
continuing NRC Survey of Earned Doctorates (CASPAR, 1999).
A more extensive discussion regarding HEGIS and IPEDS data in CASPAR can be
found in Appendix B.  This study also utilized three other data sets generated by
Halstead, Mortenson and Volkwein.
Halstead and Research Associates of Washington, D.C., collected data
related to the financing of higher education from 1978 to 1998.  Halstead annually
published data describing trends related to the financing of higher education.  The
purpose of this research was to do the following:
• Encourage the study of financing as a shared responsibility of the state’s
entire higher education community
• Advance interstate comparisons as a useful method of evaluation in the
absence of absolute standards;
• Require rigorous data definitions to establish comparability;
• Emphasize the relationships and workings of all variables rather than
concentrating on final funding achievement;
• Suggest that trends are more important to planning than current status;
• Incorporate adjustment factors to correct for variation among states in
system design and purchasing power (Halstead, 1998, p.2).
The raw data obtained from Research Associates for fiscal years 1978 to 1996 were
then imported from a dbase file into an SPSS data file.
Mortenson’s research on state funding of public higher education is
published annually in the monthly newsletter, "Postsecondary Opportunity."
                                                           
1 SRS is the Division of Science and Resources Studies, which is an agency within the National
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Mortenson presents a simple linear regression forecasting the future year when
each state's funding of public higher education will reach zero.  An SPSS data table
was created utilizing Mortenson’s 1998 results.  In a similar manner, the Volkwein
data used in this research came from the results of two studies, one conducted in
1983 and one in 1995.  The data were transferred into an SPSS data table from data
presented in two articles, one by Volkwein (1986) and the other by both Volkwein
and Malik (1997).
The data were analyzed according to the Carnegie Classification system that
was in use in 1996 and does not utilize the recently released millennial edition.
The U.S. Department of Education uses the Carnegie classification system as an
institutional type identifier.  The typology used for this study originated from the
Carnegie Foundation For The Advancement of Teaching 1973 report, which
grouped institutions into 20 categories, based on the level of degree offered and a
variety of other indicators related to institutional mission.  The typology was
updated in 1976, 1987 and 1994.  The typology ranges from Research Universities
to Not-Classified organizations.  Eight of the 20 institutional types were used in
this research as defined in Appendix A.
The study population initially consisted of 534 institutions.  After a review
of the databases, it became apparent that a number of institutions operating in 1996
did not submit HEGIS data in 1966.  Because this was a longitudinal analysis, only
                                                                                                                                                                   
Science Foundation.
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institutions that reported data every year from fiscal year 1966–1967 to 1995–1996
were included in this study.  This reduced the number of institutions in the sample
to 369 institutions.  Even with this reduction, all states and all Carnegie
classifications were included in the study.  The completed databases were analyzed
using a filter variable to include only the institutions that submitted data for years
1967 to 1996.
Variables
Each institution was analyzed using 17variables. The 17variables were
categorized as finance variables and control variables, as shown in Figure 3.2.
The first four finance variables were obtained through CASPAR from the
HEGIS/IPEDS databases for years 1967 to 1996.  The first variable, Institution,
included private, non-governmental funding sources, that is revenue that can be
generated by any institution, whether public or private.  Specific examples include
tuition, student fees, private gifts (or donations), endowment income, contracts and
grants, sales and services of educational activities, auxiliary enterprise income, and
income from other independent operations.
64
Figure 3.2: Finance Variables (upper box) and Control Variables (lower
box)
          Study Variable                                           HEGIS/IPEDS Variables
Institution Tuition and Fees + Contracts and Grants + Private Gifts
+ Endowment Income + Sales and Services of
Educational Activities + Auxiliary Enterprises +
 Other Sources + Independent Operations
Government Federal + State +Local Appropriations
State State Appropriations
Student              Tuition and Fees
SSTR                                            State Share of Total Revenue
Study Variable                          Halstead Variables
STWEAL                       State Tax Wealth
STWEEN                                   Tax Wealth Relative To Enrollment Load
STSUP                  State Tax Effort
STATPE                                     State Payment Effort
STOTHD                                    State Appropriations
STRHD                                      State Total Taxable Resources
Study Variable                          Mortenson Variables
            StAppPerInc                         State Appropriations Per $1,000 Of
                                                                Personal Income
            Reach0                                       The Year That State Appropriations Are
                                                               Forecasted To Be Zero
            Rreach0                                      Reach0 Ranked By State In Ascending
                                                               Order
            Study Variable                     U.S. Census Variables
            REPUB                                    The Percentage of  Registered Republican
                                                             Voters Who Voted In A  Presidential
                                                             Election
            EDUC                                      Percentage of Adults 25 Years and Older
                                                             with 4 or More Years of Higher Education
              Study Variables                                   VolkweinVariables
                  AcadFlex        Academic Flexibility
                 FiscalFlex        Financial Flexibility
The second variable, Government, included all government or public
funding of annual institutional operations, specifically federal, state and local
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appropriations.  The third variable, State, consisted of only that portion of the
Government variable from annual state appropriations.  The fourth variable,
Student, included the tuition and fees that students or their parents paid to their
college or university for their education.  The Student variable was a part of the
Institution variable but was also studied separately. The fifth variable, SSTR, was
State Share of Total Revenue which was the ratio of state appropriations to total
operational funding for a public institution of higher learning.
The next six finance variables were imported from the Halstead database,
which was available for fiscal years 1978 to 1996.  The first Halstead variable,
STWEAL, was State Tax Wealth, which was determined by tax revenues collected
per capita from the citizens within the state. The second Halstead variable,
STWEEN, was Tax Wealth Relative To Enrollment Load, which consisted of state
and local tax revenue per full-time equivalent student attending a public college or
university.
The third Halstead variable, STSUP, was State Tax Effort, which measured
“the percentage of state total taxable resources or tax potential that is actually used”
(Halstead, 1998, p.11).  Halstead assigned the national tax effort to a scale, with
100 as the national average.  Each state was measured in relation to the national
average.  The fourth Halstead variable, STATPE, was State Payment Effort, which
consisted of the state appropriations allocated to each college student divided by
the tax revenue per capita of the citizens within the state.  The fifth variable,
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STOTHD, was the state’s appropriations to all public institutions of higher
education per full-time equivalent student.  The sixth and final Halstead variable,
STRHD, was State Total Taxable Resources, which included the “gross product of
a state plus the comprehensive economic income of residents as measured by total
taxable resources” (Halstead, 1998, p.11).  State Appropriations (STOTHD) and
State Total Taxable Resources (STRHD) were used to calculate the State Payment
Effort (STATPE).
The twelfth and thirteenth finance variables were taken from Mortenson’s
database.  During the initial review of Mortenson’s data, the first variable
considered was the variable, StAppPerInc, which was the amount of state
appropriations to public institutions of higher education per $1,000 of personal
income.  After further discussion and correspondence with Mortenson, another
variable called Reach0 was added.  The Reach0 variable consisted of the intercept
of a simple linear regression that Mortenson computed using the state
appropriations per $1,000 of personal income by state.  Reach0 was the year that
state appropriations for public higher education would be reduced to zero if the
historical pattern of state appropriations remained unchanged.  For this study,
Reach0 was considered to be the single variable that indicated the extent of
privatization. However because there were a few states that were significant
outliers this variable was converted to a ranking called Rreach0.
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The next two finance variables were imported from the United States
Census decennial database.  Data from the 1980 and 2000 Census was used. The
first US Census variable EDUC was Education, which was the percentage of
citizens 25 years old or older with four or more years of higher education by state.
The second US Census variable, REPUB, was Republican, which was the
percentage of citizens who voted Republican in presidential elections by state.
The second set of variables indicated the extent states control public higher
education.  Two control variables, incorporated from previous studies by Volkwein,
became the thirteenth and fourteenth variables.  These two control variables
together described the extent to which the state controls public institutions of
higher learning.  The thirteenth variable was AcadFlex, or Academic Flexibility.
This was a six-item composite variable taken from a 1982 Carnegie Foundation
survey, which indicated the extent to which a state controls the academic functions
of an institution (Volkwein, 1983).  The fourteenth variable, FiscalFlex, or
Financial Flexibility, was composed of nine items taken from Volkwein’s 1983
survey, which quantified the extent to which institutions were fiscally controlled by
the state (Volkwein, 1983).
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Conversion to Constant Dollars
Financial data in the CASPAR system were recorded in actual dollars.
Constant dollar values were determined by dividing actual dollar amounts by the
Higher Education Price Index (Halstead, 1996).  The Higher Education Price Index
(HEPI) is annually produced by the Research Associates of Washington (Halstead,
1996).  The HEPI is considered an alternative cost of living index in that it is
intended to be more sensitive to higher education financial analysis than is the
Consumer Price Index (CPI).  The HEPI uses the same compilation processes as
the Consumer Price Index, but the “market basket” of goods and services tracked is
specifically related to the institutional purchasing of higher education.  The higher
education “market basket” includes goods and services typically purchased by
institutions of higher learning such as faculty and staff salaries, and library books in
addition to items used in the Consumer Price Index like food, housing, and clothing
(Halstead, 1996, p.86).  The base year used for the calculation of the HEPI in this
study was 1983.  CASPAR financial data for all years were expressed in terms of
1983 dollars.  The HEPI inflation factors were calculated for this study utilizing the
HEPI adjustment program found in CASPAR.  The HEPI adjusted data presented
for years 1967 to 1996 are shown in detail in Appendix C.
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Hypotheses and Research Questions
This study was comprised of two research hypotheses, and each hypothesis
was further subdivided into three research questions.  After testing the hypotheses
and answering the research questions, the final result will be to further develop the
Conceptual Model for the Privatization of Public Higher Education presented in
Figure 3.1.
First Hypothesis
Public institutions of higher learning have over time become funded
proportionally more by private sources than by state appropriated
sources.
The following three research questions test this hypothesis:
1. What was the actual rate of shift from state funds to non-
governmental funds over time by state and by institutional type?
2. What variables have influenced these shifts?
3. Based on the rate of shifting from state to non-governmental
funds over time, which states and institutional types are more
likely to become increasingly privatized?
Second Hypothesis
State funding of public institutions of higher learning is not
related to state control.
The following three research questions test this hypothesis:
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4. What variables indicate state control of public higher education,
and how have these variables changed over time?
5. How strong was the relationship between state control and
funding of public institutions of higher learning over time?
6. Based on the past relationship between state control and state
funding of public institutions of higher education, what is the
predicted relationship by state and by institutional type?
Statistical Methodology
The methodology used included descriptive, bivariate, regression and time
series analysis utilizing data from several sources.  These sources included the
finance revenue section of the Higher Education General Survey (HEGIS) and the
Integrated Postsecondary Educational Database System (IPEDS). Data from the
Halstead, Mortenson, U.S. Census, and Volkwein research organizations were also
used.  The analysis included 369 public institutions of higher learning in all fifty
states.  The following is a figure outlining the various measures and data sources
used:
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Figure 3.3: Statistical Methodology
Figure 3.3 illustrates the data collection sources and the statistical analysis
used for this research.   The data were extracted from the HEGIS/IPEDS, Halstead,
US Census, Volkwein and Mortenson databases described earlier.  All of the data
were imported into an SPSS data editor.  In order to examine trends in state funding
and control, descriptive statistics were developed by adding, subtracting, dividing






Halstead Data U.S. Census
Finance Variables Statistical Analysis SPSS Control Variables
Descriptive Statistics Regression Analysis Time Series Analysis
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on the finance and control variables in order to determine which ones were
significantly related to each other and to Rreach0, dependent variable.  Those
finance variables that were determined to be significantly related to Rreach0 in the
regression analysis were converted to standard scores, and added together to
represent the extent to which each state had supported public higher education in
the past and present.
First Hypothesis: Statistical Methodology
Public institutions of higher learning have over time become
funded proportionally more by private sources than by state
appropriated sources.
Research Question One:
In order to test the first hypothesis, Research Question One asked: What
was the actual rate of shift from state funds to non-governmental funds over time by
state and by institutional type?
The institutions of higher education in the study were examined by state and
by institutional type to ascertain trends or rates of shifting among the finance
variables from 1967 to 1996.  Data were collected for the years 1967 to 1996.  The
state appropriations variable, State, was divided by the total revenue for all public
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institutions in each state for each year.  This calculation created a percentage that
represented each state’s share of the total revenue for its public higher education
institutions.
In order to examine the actual rate of shift from state funds to non-
governmental funds, seven years of data were selected within the 1967 to
1996 period.  The years selected were 1966–1967, 1971–1972, 1976–1977,
1981–1982, 1986–1987, 1991–1992 and 1995–1996.
Research Question Two:
In order to test the first hypothesis, Research Question Two asked: What
variables have influenced these shifts?
Whereas Research Question One outlined changes in public funding from
1967 to1996, Research Question Two determined whether any of the finance
variables influenced these changes in state funding. The finance variables were
analyzed using descriptive statistics. A correlation analysis was conducted with all
of the finance variables.  One finance variable, StAppPerInc, which was the amount
of state appropriations to public institutions of higher education per $1,000 of
personal income, was not used because the Reach0 variable was a function of that
variable.
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Each of the databases had different years of available data.  HEGIS/IPEDS
data were available from 1967 to 1996, while the Halstead data were available from
1978 to 1996.  US Census data bases were used for 1980 and 2000.  Analysis was
conducted on the first and last years where the databases overlapped, i.e.
1978,1996 for the HEGIS-IPEDS and Halstead data and 1980 and 2000 for the
Census data.  For purposes of the study, therefore, 1978/1980 data was considered
to represent the past, 1996/2000 data was considered to represent the present, and
the Rreach0 variable represented the future.
The dependent variable used for the regression analysis was Rreach0, the
ranking of the year each state was predicted to stop funding higher education based
on historical patterns. Mortenson calculated the Reach0 variable by using a simple
linear regression of state appropriations per $1,000 of personal income from 1975
to 1998 (Mortenson, 1998).  Both Reach0 and Rreach0 represented the likelihood
of each state’s potential for privatization of public higher education.
Specifically, the correlation analysis was based on the Pearson’s product
moment correlation coefficient, or Pearson’s r.  The relationships between
1978/1980 finance variables were analyzed through a correlation matrix. Those
variables found to be significantly related to each other were analyzed using
regression analysis. Each of the finance variables were also analyzed by calculating
the change over time from 1978 to 1996 (1980 to 2000 in the case of census
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variables).  A correlation analysis was performed using these change variables as
well.
The variables found to be significantly related to the Rreach0 variable were
then analyzed using step-wise regression, a common method when working with
independent variables that have a strong correlation to the dependent variable.  As
with any regression analysis, the stepwise method evaluates positive, negative and
partial correlations between the dependent and independent variables.  The
stepwise method tests whether to remove variables from the analysis.
Research Question Three:
In order to test the first hypothesis, Research Question Three asked:
Based on the rate of shifting from state to non-governmental funds over
time, which states and institutional types are more likely to become
increasingly privatized?
Of the 13 Finance variables included in the regression analysis for
Research Question Two, four were found to be significantly related to the
privatization variable, Rreach0.  These variables were studied further as a
part of the analysis. The values of the four finance variables were
recomputed as standard scores and then added together for 1978 and 1996
(1980 and 2000 in the case for the Census variables).
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The 1978/1980 standard scores represented the past state funding of public
higher education.  The 1996/2000 standard scores represented the current state
funding of public higher education.  Finally, rankings in Rreach0 represented the
future scores.  The past, current, and future scores were analyzed in rank order by
state and by institutional type.
Second Hypothesis: Statistical Methodology
State funding of public institutions of higher learning is not
related to state control.
Research Question Four:
In order to test the second hypothesis, Research Question Four asked: What
variables indicate state control of public higher education and how have these
variables changed over time?
All public institutions of higher education in the study were
examined to ascertain trends related to the extent to which the states
controlled higher education over time.  The control variables, Academic
Flexibility (AcadFlex) and Financial Flexibility (FiscalFlex), were first
determined in Volkwein’s 1983 study, and then another set of results came
from Volkwein’s and Malik’s 1995 study.
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These two studies, done 12 years apart, provided two data points
that indicated the extent to which each state attempted to control public
higher education. The 1983 data represented past control, while the 1995
data represented current control. In order to calculate the change in control
over time, the 1983 Academic Flexibility variable and the Fiscal Flexibility
variable were
added together to create a 1983 control score.  Likewise, the 1995
Academic and Fiscal Flexibility variables were added together.  Then the
total 1983 control score was subtracted from the total 1995 control score
with the difference indicating a change in control over time. The amount of
the difference indicated the extent to which state control had increased or
decreased over time.  The amount of the difference was then added to the
1995 control score to create a future control score.  The past, current and
future control scores were analyzed state and by institutional type.
Research Question Five:
In order to test the second hypothesis, Research Question Five
asked: How strong was the relationship between state control and funding
of public institutions of higher learning over time?
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The Correlation analysis was used to examine the relationships between
state control and funding. These funding and control scores also created
coordinates that were used to plot each state onto a four-sector matrix.  Likelihood
of Privatization Matrix is shown in Figure 3.4. The sectors were named as a
beginning effort to understand comparative differences in the various
control/funding relationships presented in the matrix. The four sectors were labeled
State Agency, State Aided, State Constrained and State Located.
Figure 3.4: Likelihood of Privatization Matrix
                          <State Agency>                                         <State Aided>









The quadrants of the Likelihood of Privatizations Matrix were defined by
plotting the control and finance scores onto the scatter diagram shown above or
below the mean of each of the scores.  The mean for the control scores formed the
x-axis, whereas the mean for the finance variable formed the y-axis.  The quadrant
comprised of states with high state control and high state funding scores was
labeled the State Agency quadrant.  Since the public colleges and universities in
this quadrant received comparatively greater state funding than other states, but
experienced comparatively greater state control, they were considered to operate
more like other state government agencies.  These states were expected to have
comparatively more involvement in academic and fiscal decision-making.ll        The
quadrant comprised of states with low state control and high state funding was
labeled State Aided.  Because of comparatively lower state control, the public
institutions in these states were expected to have more autonomy along with a
continued expectation of comparatively high state funding over time.
The quadrant comprised of states with high state control and low state
funding was identified as State Constrained. These states exercise comparatively
greater control over their public higher education institutions, but they provide
them with comparatively lower funding.  The institutions were expected to have
relatively low levels of fiscal and academic autonomy and limited possibilities for
future state funding compared to other states.
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The quadrant comprised of states with low state control and low state
funding was labeled State Located.  These states exercise comparatively low levels
of state control over their public colleges and universities.  However, they provide
them with comparatively low levels of funding, and this financial situation is likely
to continue in the future.
Research Question Six:
In order to test the second hypothesis, Research Question Six asked: Based
on the past relationship between state control and state funding of public
institutions of higher education, what is the future predicted relationship by state
and by institutional type?
Future control and finance scores were calculated in order to determine the
future relationship between state control and state funding.  Using the past and
current control scores that were analyzed to answer Research Question Four, a
future control score was calculated.  The change in control by state from 1983
to1995 was added to the 1995 control score and used to predict future changes in
control by creating a new score.  The Rreach0 variable was used as the future
funding score.  The data were examined by state.  The predicted finance and control
scores were plotted onto a Future Privatization Matrix that utilized the same four
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quadrants used for Research Question Five. The number of states in each sector for
each time period was summarized in order to consider trends over time.
Summary
The data and methodology used in this research was outlined in this chapter.
The study included 369 public institutions of higher learning that completed both
the HEGIS/IPEDS and Halstead reports from 1967 to 1996.  The study variables
were divided into two groups, finance variables and control variables.  Finance
variables included the state, student and institutional contributions to funding
public institutions of higher education as well as political and educational
indicators.  The control variables included indicators of academic and financial
flexibility for the institutions involved.
The data used in this study were analyzed with descriptive, time series,
correlation, and regression techniques in order to investigate the six research
questions. Finally, scatter-plot diagrams were created to illustrate the past, current
and future relationships between state funding and state control.
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Chapter IV
Presentation and Analysis of Data
Higher education is a peculiar social institution. - Millett, J .D., 1972
Introduction
This chapter is a presentation and analysis of results based on the
methodology described in Chapter III, which examined two hypotheses by
answering six research questions.  The six research questions were designed to
identify trends in state control and funding of public higher education from 1967 to
1996 and to consider future trends.   The first three research questions were
designed to address actual and predicted trends in state funding of higher education
in relation to other funding sources.  The fourth and fifth research questions
addressed trends in state control of public higher education and the relationship
between control and funding.  Finally, the sixth research question predicted the
likelihood of future state control and funding trends.
The research questions were organized into two sections with each section
designed to support a hypothesis.  The First Hypothesis, “Public institutions of
higher learning have over time become funded proportionally more by private
sources than by state appropriated sources,” was examined by answering Research
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Questions One, Two and Three. The Second Hypothesis, “State funding of public
institutions of higher learning is not related to state control,” was examined by
answering Research Questions Four, Five and Six.
Research Question One involved an explanation of the trends in state
appropriations over time.  Research Question Two involved an explanation of
specific finance variables that influenced the trends found in Research Question
One.  Research Question Three involved an explanation of forecasted trends in
state appropriations over time.  Research Question Four involved an explanation of
trends in state control of public higher education over time.  Research Question
Five involved an explanation of the relationship between state control and state
funding in public higher education over time.  Research Question Six involved an
explanation of the predicted future relationship between state control and state
funding in public higher education over time.
Each research question will be explained, respectively, in terms of how the
data were analyzed in order to answer the question, how the tables and figures were
constructed, and the results found.
Research Question One
The results for Research Question One (RQ1), “What was the actual rate of
shift from state funds to non-governmental funds over time by state and by
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institutional type?” were derived by computing the changes in state appropriations
support for higher education as a percentage of the institutions’ total funding for
seven selected years 1966–1967, 1971–1972, 1976–1977, 1981–1982, 1986–1987,
1991–1992 and 1995–1996.  State support for public institutions of higher
education was examined by studying how much each state funded public higher
education as a percentage of the institutions’ total revenue.  State support for public
institutions of higher education as a percentage of all  institutional revenues was
referred to as the State Share of Total Revenue (SSTR).
The State Share of Total Revenue was determined by dividing state
appropriations for public higher education by the total revenue for all of the public
institutions by state and by institutional type.  The Total Public Higher Education
Revenue was the sum of the Institution and Government variables introduced in
Chapter III, which included revenues from student tuition and fees, contracts and
grants, private gifts, endowment income, sales and services of educational
activities, auxiliary enterprises, and federal, state and local appropriations.  The
formula for computing the state share for all the public four-year institutions was as
follows:
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State Appropriations/Total Public Higher Education Revenue = State Share of
Total Revenue
In order to examine the change in the percentage of institutional
funding sources from state funds to non-governmental funds over time,
Table 4.1 presents results by state for selected years 1966–1967,
1971–1972, 1976–1977, 1981–1982, 1986–1987, 1991–1992 and
1995–1996.  Table 4.1 shows state appropriations to four-year public
colleges and universities divided by the total revenue for these institutions
in each state and for the nation as a whole in each of the seven years over a
30-year period.
Several interesting observations can be made from Table 4.1.  For
example, in most states the proportion of state support increased from the
1960s to the mid-1980s but then decreased in the 1990s.  The most
populous states, California, New York, Texas and Florida experienced a
variety of changes, with Florida experiencing the pattern just mentioned and
California showing relatively consistent support until the mid-1990s.  New
York showed a proportional decrease to a relative plateau from the mid-
1970s to the mid-1980s and then
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Table 4.1:
Average State Share of Total Public Higher Education Revenue 1966-67, 1971-72, 1976-77, 1981-82, 1986-87,
1995-96 By State
37.7% 50.4% 78.8% 86.3% 75.0% 69.7% 63.0%
51.0% 44.2% 47.6% 46.4% 52.3% 45.7% 44.1%
41.0% 41.6% 52.0% 52.5% 56.8% 52.2% 50.3%
37.2% 46.2% 51.3% 50.1% 48.4% 44.0% 42.0%
71.0% 69.8% 73.1% 70.9% 70.3% 73.5% 62.1%
49.6% 43.3% 44.2% 40.0% 43.6% 39.1% 36.4%
69.4% 53.0% 53.3% 54.4% 56.1% 51.0% 44.0%
31.8% 35.2% 29.2% 29.0% 26.9% 22.3% 21.0%
42.7% 51.2% 58.7% 65.4% 63.3% 53.7% 51.0%
46.9% 49.3% 51.7% 59.7% 59.0% 52.8% 53.4%
52.4% 37.6% 52.5% 57.0% 57.0% 59.7% 46.9%
36.8% 39.4% 46.3% 44.0% 39.7% 38.6% 37.8%
39.0% 55.0% 65.6% 52.9% 53.8% 52.7% 46.0%
68.0% 57.9% 56.5% 56.7% 54.8% 48.0% 48.1%
44.8% 46.8% 52.7% 50.4% 56.8% 52.4% 48.9%
44.0% 43.6% 55.2% 54.4% 53.1% 53.4% 52.5%
47.1% 57.0% 54.6% 58.2% 56.5% 50.8% 46.7%
61.7% 56.7% 57.4% 59.7% 54.0% 47.6% 40.0%
67.1% 72.1% 60.7% 58.8% 65.0% 38.9% 46.6%
51.9% 53.3% 52.7% 52.9% 55.4% 47.2% 41.2%
51.0% 50.4% 41.0% 39.7% 43.6% 47.6% 44.5%
48.3% 46.5% 45.8% 42.9% 47.3% 42.9% 38.6%
44.5% 49.8% 56.8% 55.8% 53.3% 48.2% 47.0%
58.1% 53.5% 61.0% 54.9% 53.6% 45.2% 45.1%
39.2% 43.5% 40.1% 49.9% 43.1% 37.3% 44.8%
46.2% 51.2% 52.9% 56.6% 51.7% 48.9% 36.9%
46.0% 47.1% 51.7% 54.9% 56.1% 52.2% 49.4%
38.4% 42.6% 48.7% 52.8% 49.6% 41.3% 38.1%
37.8% 41.3% 56.1% 56.3% 52.0% 50.9% 49.7%
32.8% 24.6% 25.8% 24.6% 24.8% 20.2% 19.0%
57.8% 59.2% 52.7% 56.2% 61.1% 58.7% 54.0%
41.0% 42.0% 50.2% 51.4% 56.6% 50.4% 50.2%
39.4% 54.0% 57.8% 48.8% 49.1% 48.1% 45.8%
74.7% 75.4% 61.1% 65.0% 66.6% 57.6% 47.8%
28.0% 38.9% 44.6% 40.0% 44.4% 37.0% 38.1%
38.9% 38.6% 46.0% 60.4% 56.5% 52.2% 48.9%
41.5% 41.5% 46.5% 43.3% 44.0% 40.6% 31.8%
47.8% 50.0% 58.6% 55.6% 52.1% 45.2% 42.3%
61.0% 47.9% 54.6% 50.8% 50.7% 37.8% 37.4%
44.4% 44.4% 54.2% 49.2% 45.8% 39.0% 36.2%
42.0% 32.3% 39.3% 39.3% 43.4% 43.9% 42.3%
46.6% 52.1% 55.6% 52.6% 56.7% 49.7% 51.9%
45.4% 52.6% 53.5% 58.7% 50.5% 50.9% 49.0%
38.8% 38.3% 48.1% 45.8% 43.8% 38.5% 39.4%
36.1% 40.3% 43.3% 46.8% 44.6% 34.8% 33.1%
38.4% 32.1% 26.0% 24.4% 22.8% 17.4% 15.3%
53.7% 51.9% 55.5% 48.5% 47.8% 44.5% 38.2%
50.8% 48.0% 51.0% 48.1% 45.2% 44.9% 43.3%
51.9% 58.5% 60.5% 55.7% 53.9% 48.4% 46.1%
38.0% 36.0% 42.7% 34.5% 55.9% 43.9% 41.0%
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decreases in the 1990s, and Texas showed a proportional increase in the mid-1970s
and early 1980s but a decrease in the mid-1980s and the 1990s.  Several states
(New York, California, Massachusetts) consistently allocated larger shares of state
revenues to higher education compared to other states, at least during some of the
30-year period.  But some states (Delaware, New Hampshire, Ohio, Virginia,
Vermont) were consistently less supportive of public higher education.
Table 4.2 compares the 1966–1967 and 1995–1996 States Share of Total
Revenue.  It shows that from 1967 to 1996 public colleges and universities
nationally experienced a decline in state support as a percentage of the institutions’
total revenue by state.  In 1967, nationally, the average state support was 49.7% of
total institutions’ budgets.  In 1967 sixteen states funded more than 50% of the
operating budgets of their public institutions of higher learning.  By 1996 state
share of the institutional budgets had declined 4.7% to 45% with only nine states
funding more than 50%.
In addition to the declining national average over the 30-year period, it is
important to note that different states had very different rates of change, and
declines in state support were larger than increases.  For example, from 1967 to
1996, twenty-eight states experienced decreases in the percentage of state support,
ranging from North Dakota and Kentucky, which decreased less than 1%, to New
York and Connecticut where the decreases were in excess of 25%.  Twenty-two
states experienced increases in the percentage of state support, ranging from South
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Dakota and Utah where increases were less than 1% to Ohio and Nebraska with an
increase of over 10% and Alaska with an increase of over 25%.
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Table 4.2:
Average State Share of Total Public Higher Education



















































































































The results in Table 4.2 indicated a decline or shifting in the state funding,
which supports the work of Mortenson (1998), Halstead (1998) and Gumport
(1998).  Nationally, Mortenson found a steady decline in state funding over the past
27 years.  Halstead found a general decline in state funding from 1978 to 1998.
Reviewing Halstead’s work, Gumport found that the declines in state funding
coincided with increases in student funding of higher education. Table 4.3 shows
the same information broken down by institutional type, rather than by state.  For
the purpose of this analysis, Liberal Arts 1 & 2 institutions were combined.  For all
seven of the selected years, Research 1 universities received less than 50% of their
operating budgets from state appropriations.  The allocation from the states for the
seven selected years ranged from 44.9% in 1976–1977 to 35.9% in 1995–1996.
Public Research 1 universities received 35.9% of their revenue from the various
states in 1996 compared to 37% in 1967, a decline of 1.1%.
Table 4.3:
Average State Share of Total Public Higher Education Revenue 1966-67, 1971-72, 1976-77, 1981-82, 1986-87,
1995-96 By Carnegie Classification
37.0% 38.7% 44.9% 44.2% 42.9% 37.1% 35.9%
39.7% 41.7% 46.5% 46.6% 46.1% 41.5% 39.3%
45.1% 50.1% 53.7% 53.9% 53.9% 48.5% 46.2%
48.7% 50.3% 53.9% 51.9% 51.8% 45.6% 41.9%
52.7% 54.0% 55.3% 56.5% 56.1% 50.9% 47.2%
46.8% 43.2% 48.3% 49.3% 49.3% 43.2% 39.8%
52.0% 51.9% 52.5% 52.6% 56.9% 47.6% 45.6%
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Table 4.3 indicates that from 1967 to 1996 all types of public colleges and
universities experienced increases in proportional support for states from the early
1970s through the mid-1980s and proportional decreases in the 1990s.  All types of
institutions received proportionally fewer state funds in 1996 than in 1967, except
Doctoral 1 institutions, which received a 1.1% increase from 45.1% to 46.2%.  The
table shows that declines in Research 1 institutions occurred earlier than other types
with declines beginning in the early 1980s.  The declines ranged from less than a
1% decline for Research 2 institutions to a 7% decline for Comprehensive 2
institutions.  There was a blip in funding for Liberal Arts institutions in the mid-
1980s.  Prior to that time, state funding of these institutions was relatively flat at
about 52%.  After that, proportional state funding levels dropped as in most other
types of institutions.
Research Question Two
To answer Research Question Two, “What variables have influenced these
shifts?” the finance variables were analyzed using correlation and regression
analysis. The results of the regression analysis determined that of the 13 variables
used to develop a finance model, four of the variables together were significant
predictors of these shifts in privatization.
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In order to explain how the data were analyzed, the results of Research
Question Two are described in the following three sections.  The first section
describes the dependent variable Rreach0 by state, the second section describes the
independent variables, and the third section presents the results of the correlation
and regression analysis.
Dependent Variable Description
As described previously, the dependent variable for this regression analysis
was Rreach0, a ranking of the variable constructed by Mortenson to predict the year
a state would allocate zero state appropriated dollars based on historical funding
patterns.  Mortenson calculated the Reach0 variable by using a simple linear
regression of state appropriations per $1,000 of personal income from 1975 to 1998
(Mortenson, 1998).  Rreach0 represents the likelihood of each state’s potential for
privatization of public higher education.
The order in which each state is predicted to reach zero funding was
presented in Table 4.4.  Vermont was the most privatized state because it was the
first state predicted to reach zero funding (in the year 2015) of its public institutions
of higher education.  The median year for Reach0 was 2054, and the least
privatized state, ranked number 50, was New Mexico, which was not indicated to
intercept at zero for several millennia.  According to Mortenson, 16 states will have
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reached zero state funding by 2030 and will have fully privatized public higher
education.  These 16 states include New York, California and Texas, which are the
most populous states.  Another interesting finding was that these 16 states currently
support 178 public four-year institutions.  New York, California and Texas alone
support 92.
Independent Variable Description
Research Question Two used HEGIS/IPEDS, Halstead, and Census data as
the independent variables for the regression analysis.  Data for years 1978–1996
(1980 and 2000 data was used in the case for Census data) were used for this
analysis.  The following variables were the independent variables used to build the
regression model.
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Table 4.4: The Ranking Of The Year Predicted For Privatization By State
(Rreach0 Variable)
1. 2015 Vermont 27. 2055 Kansas
2. 2018 New York, Rhode Island 28. 2060 No Carolina, Tennessee
3. 2020 California 30. 2061 Missouri, Nevada
4. 2021 Alaska 32. 2062 Alabama
5. 2023 Virginia 33. 2066 Kentucky
6. 2024 Colorado 34. 2069 Michigan
7. 2025 So Carolina 35. 2074 Illinois
8. 2026 Washington 36. 2079 Idaho
9. 2027 Texas 37. 2081 Mississippi, West Virginia
10. 2028 Arizona, Louisiana 39. 2085 North Dakota
Montana
13. 2029Oregon 40. 2097 South Dakota
14. 2030 Florida, New Hampshire 41. 2105 Indiana
16. 2034 Wisconsin 42. 2110 Wyoming
     2037  Average 43. 2162 Oklahoma
17. 2038 Connecticut 44. 2194 Arkansas
18. 2039 Maryland 45. 2209 Iowa
19. 2040 Delaware 46. 2216 Ohio
21. 2042Georgia 47. 2234 Nebraska
22. 2047 Utah 48. 2392 New Jersey
23. 2048 Hawaii 49.2979 Maine
24. 2053 Minnesota 50. 7119 New Mexico





 State Tax Wealth (STWEAL)
 State Tax Wealth Relative To Enrollment Load (STWEEN)
 State Tax Effort (STSUP)
 State Payment Effort (STATPE)
 State Appropriations (STOTHD)










The values of the Halstead variables for 1978 and 1996 are shown in Table
4.5 for each state.  These are state averages calculated by Halstead from his 1998
report.  The U.S. average for each variable was calculated by adding the values for
all states and then dividing by the number of states in the study.  All funds have
been adjusted according to the Higher Education Price Index (HEPI).
State Tax Wealth (STWEAL) was the “state and local government tax
revenue collected per capita” (Halstead, 1996, p.11).  According to Halstead, this
variable represents “the wealth available to state and local governments for public
use” (p.11).  It does not consider what Halstead refers to as “social needs,” but only
the resource capacity of the state.  It is possible that an apparently wealthy state
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might have extensive social needs and therefore appear rich but in fact be
experiencing fiscal strain. The State Tax Wealth (STWEAL) national average





The next Halstead variable was State Wealth Relative To Enrollment Load
(STWEEN), which was the “state and local tax revenue collected per FTE” student
(Halstead, 1996, p.23).  State Wealth Relative To Enrollment Load increased an
average of almost $20,000 over the 19-year period.  From 1978 to 1996, State
Wealth Relative To Enrollment Load increased from a mean of $69,216 to $89,815.
All states but four had increases in State Tax Wealth Relative To Enrollment Load.
States with the largest increases included Nevada, Massachusetts, Maine, Hawaii
and Connecticut.  States with decreases were Alaska, Iowa, Montana and
Wyoming.
The variable State Tax Effort (STSUP) was the “state and local government
tax revenue collected as a percent of state and local tax potential” (Halstead, 1996,
p.11).  In this analysis the average State Tax Effort across all states remained
unchanged from 1978 to 1996.  Twenty-nine states increased state and local tax
revenue as a percentage of what Halstead calculated as the state and local tax
potential.  However, 13 states were unchanged and eight states decreased the
amount of tax revenue to tax potential.
The State Payment Effort variable (STATPE) was defined as the “percent of
state and local government collected tax revenue that is appropriated or levied for
education operating expenses of public institutions” (Halstead, 1996, p.12).  This
variable indicated the extent to which state and local governments actually funded
public institutions of higher education relative to their capacity.  From 1978 to
1996, the average State Payment Effort decreased from 2.6% to 2.0%.  Halstead
indicated that this variable expressed the relative level of importance of higher
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education to each state.  This variable supported previous research findings that
state funding for higher education has on average declined relative to other state
spending priorities.  Forty-two out of 50 states had declining State Payment Effort.
When reviewing State Payment Effort by state, the results are very
interesting in that 48 states experienced increases in per capita state wealth from
1978 to 1996, whereas 42 states decreased state and local appropriated funds for
higher education as a percent of state and local government tax revenues.  As most
states became more affluent, they did not pass on that affluence to public higher
education.  The State Payment Effort in Delaware, Nevada, Texas and Wyoming
remained unchanged.  It is important to note that Wyoming had a decline in state
wealth.  Four states—Florida, Maine, Oklahoma and New Mexico—had slight
increases in State Payment Effort.  The five states with the largest declines included
Alaska, New York, Rhode Island, Kentucky and Hawaii.
The State Appropriations variable (STOTHD) represented the state
appropriations for operating expenses for public higher education in the state
divided by the full-time equivalent (FTE) student enrollment.  The average State
Appropriations decreased $282 per student from $5,484 in 1978 to $5,202 in 1996.
Thirty-three states decreased state appropriations with Alaska posting the largest
per student decrease by far, followed by Rhode Island, Kentucky and New York.
Seventeen states increased state appropriations, with Maine and Georgia posting
the largest increases.
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The State Total Taxable Resources (STRHD) represented the total collected
state tax revenues in the state per capita.  The average State Total Taxable
Resources increased over $500 per capita from $2,107 in 1978 to $2,646 in 1996.
All but three states had increases in total state tax revenues per capita with the
largest increases occurring in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey and New
York.  Three states had decreases including Montana, Nevada and Wyoming.
The Halstead finance variables described state funding of public higher
education in relation to state wealth, taxing capacity and spending priority.  From
1978 to 1996, several states experienced extreme changes as indicated by these
variables.  Wyoming had a consistent pattern of decreasing support with declines in
State Wealth and State Total Taxable Resources with no change in the State
Payment Effort.  Maine consistently had increases in State Appropriations for
higher education, including increased State Payment Effort and increased State
Wealth Relative To Enrollment.  On the other hand, New York consistently
decreased State Appropriations and State Payment Effort but had one of the largest
increases in State Total Taxable Resources.
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HEGIS/IPEDS Variables
The following four variables were taken from HEGIS/IPEDS databases:
Institution (INSTIT), Government (GOV), State (STATE) and Student (STUD).
The data for these four variables are shown in Table 4.6 for years 1978 and 1996 to
illustrate changes over time.  From 1967 to 1985, the database was called the
Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS).  In 1985 the HEGIS effort
was updated and renamed the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS).  Institutional data for each variable were analyzed by state.  Values of the
HEGIS/IPEDS variables shown in Table 4.6 are institutional averages for each
state expressed in thousands of dollars.  The U.S. average was calculated by adding
the values of each of the states for
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Table 4.6:
HEGIS/IPEDS Variables 1978 & 1996
$1,281 $8,585 $9,524 $15,254 $9,166 $14,625 $933 $4,663
$8,939 $30,395 $15,520 $33,026 $13,475 $27,278 $3,607 $13,711
$7,450 $21,989 $12,424 $31,994 $10,756 $26,578 $2,835 $12,360
$69,528 $251,598 $119,581 $293,333 $92,361 $209,108 $25,957 $113,483
$20,218 $53,947 $62,060 $89,425 $58,045 $86,691 $6,710 $39,345
$20,880 $51,753 $22,179 $42,322 $15,730 $29,618 $9,305 $26,573
$11,185 $32,109 $15,420 $27,004 $13,905 $25,942 $6,856 $22,322
$96,613 $288,260 $59,762 $122,204 $43,039 $82,551 $37,250 $152,026
$43,816 $157,902 $86,775 $227,426 $74,380 $182,561 $14,280 $45,027
$11,258 $41,729 $23,283 $65,395 $19,204 $57,137 $4,800 $19,824
$44,995 $135,800 $156,908 $275,333 $111,765 $183,969 $17,181 $44,361
$96,737 $241,817 $126,876 $260,101 $99,292 $181,798 $23,114 $75,917
$12,640 $56,252 $32,748 $69,788 $27,923 $54,653 $3,084 $21,348
$38,013 $87,628 $52,483 $83,381 $48,498 $76,987 $13,111 $38,167
$47,515 $127,957 $57,067 $126,882 $55,149 $122,345 $21,738 $70,541
$20,155 $44,102 $30,636 $57,038 $25,811 $49,192 $7,614 $21,276
$25,836 $74,729 $40,377 $67,716 $34,335 $58,353 $8,689 $27,909
$10,882 $35,042 $17,618 $28,923 $16,326 $25,098 $4,332 $19,613
$7,199 $32,292 $16,975 $32,795 $15,391 $29,783 $4,339 $22,086
$17,824 $60,286 $26,192 $59,905 $21,140 $45,581 $9,868 $30,075
$2,780 $6,563 $3,601 $5,897 $2,581 $5,090 $1,200 $3,622
$54,749 $135,142 $59,876 $107,690 $51,035 $86,501 $20,818 $58,810
$10,371 $31,371 $16,064 $28,913 $14,608 $27,090 $4,435 $16,133
$9,463 $35,535 $16,679 $32,891 $15,613 $30,463 $3,270 $19,262
$16,787 $41,472 $30,637 $56,190 $21,717 $41,355 $6,179 $18,431
$10,703 $34,975 $16,823 $28,919 $12,849 $19,434 $3,288 $15,036
$26,437 $93,292 $39,952 $105,220 $30,489 $79,648 $6,716 $22,600
$12,688 $37,713 $17,576 $32,647 $13,011 $21,529 $2,997 $13,489
$19,586 $52,254 $29,231 $56,169 $23,479 $45,821 $7,624 $19,268
$25,878 $91,695 $20,741 $36,121 $14,088 $23,828 $14,481 $46,427
$13,810 $43,922 $23,173 $57,482 $20,656 $53,482 $10,199 $27,430
$20,702 $86,483 $40,831 $111,131 $26,919 $76,911 $5,879 $19,568
$18,782 $92,275 $33,718 $116,995 $28,240 $90,755 $6,913 $31,870
$19,271 $54,276 $39,928 $61,200 $36,635 $52,763 $12,724 $31,971
$55,711 $152,110 $55,584 $108,917 $47,971 $94,374 $28,348 $87,975
$11,874 $27,665 $16,467 $34,642 $12,769 $29,928 $3,468 $11,223
$26,735 $83,209 $40,590 $64,423 $28,178 $38,125 $10,375 $40,270
$17,764 $55,485 $26,950 $42,673 $24,572 $38,469 $11,956 $35,620
$26,364 $81,405 $47,927 $69,514 $37,411 $48,626 $12,330 $48,144
$14,664 $57,049 $24,930 $46,302 $21,217 $37,241 $4,179 $24,165
$9,050 $22,935 $14,584 $24,603 $10,971 $19,749 $3,470 $11,192
$15,361 $47,934 $26,800 $59,464 $24,121 $53,595 $7,429 $23,972
$27,334 $82,257 $40,469 $88,210 $33,851 $72,014 $6,703 $33,444
$35,606 $130,526 $62,182 $135,562 $41,341 $92,423 $9,995 $36,022
$21,084 $86,747 $27,984 $62,233 $22,766 $47,800 $8,655 $38,596
$20,046 $64,061 $14,416 $19,181 $7,383 $9,752 $9,922 $34,563
$51,070 $206,844 $108,146 $209,567 $71,681 $117,878 $14,717 $70,902
$18,231 $39,184 $22,825 $35,698 $20,472 $31,999 $8,424 $20,507
$7,910 $32,033 $14,934 $38,046 $13,441 $30,938 $1,854 $16,127
$41,374 $112,943 $84,384 $129,185 $56,250 $85,542 $8,968 $29,659





































































(Dollars Expressed In Thousands)
Source: HEGIS/IPEDS (2002)
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each of the variables and dividing by the number of states in the study.  All values
have been adjusted according to the Higher Education Price Index (HEPI). The 
The Institution variable was computed as the sum of the following financial
categories:
Institution (INSTIT) = Tuition and Fees + Contracts and Grants + Private
Gifts + Endowment Income + Sales and Services of Educational Activities
+ Auxiliary Enterprises + Other Sources + Independent Operations
The INSTIT variable represented a public institution’s total revenue
excluding state appropriations.  For purposes of this study, this variable formed the
basis for the non-state or “private” funding of the institution.  For 1978 to 1996,
non-state revenue increased on average across all states from $22 million to $67
million per institution, a $45 million dollar increase over those 19 years.  All states
posted increases.  States that posted the largest increases included Florida, Iowa,
Washington, Arizona and Delaware, whereas states with the smallest increases
included Maine and Alaska.
The Government variable was the sum of Federal, State and Local
Appropriations.  GOV was the combined “public” contribution in support of an
institution.  This variable did not include federally funded financial aid.  From 1978
to 1996, the Government variable increased from an average of $35 million per
institution to $69 million.  This was a $34 million dollar increase over those 19
104
years. States that posted the largest increases included Washington, Hawaii, Iowa,
Florida and Arizona, whereas states with the smallest increases included Maine,
Vermont, and Alaska.
State appropriations to public institutions were a part of GOV, but they
were also analyzed separately because funding of public higher education was the
primary focus of this study.  From 1978 to 1996, state funding of public higher
education almost doubled from $29 million to almost $56 million.  States that
posted the largest increases included Florida and Arizona, whereas states with the
smallest increases included Vermont, Maine, Alaska and Montana.
The last finance variable contributing to the private non-state funding of
higher education was the students’ contribution through tuition and fees.  The
student’s contribution, tuition and fees, was not only evaluated separately but also
was included as a part of the Institution variable in order to account for all revenues
each institution received annually.  From 1978 to 1996, student funding of public
higher education almost quadrupled with an increase from $8 million to almost $31
million.  States that posted the largest increases included Iowa, Washington, Ohio,
Arizona and Delaware, whereas states with the smallest increases included Maine,
Alaska, South Dakota and Oklahoma.
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United States Census Variables
The values of the two variables,. Education (EDUC) and Republican (REPUB)
were taken from the U. S. Census on database. The data for these two variables are
shown in Table 4.7 for years 1980 and 2000 for each state. The data for these two
years were the closest to the beginning and the ending dates for the period of this
study. Education (EDUC) was the percentage of the state population 25 years and
older with four or more years of higher education. From 1980 to 2000, the
Education variable increased from an average of 16.1% to 24.9%, an  8.8%
increase over 20 years.  States that posted the largest increases included Minnesota,
Massachusetts, and Virginia. Republican (REPUB) was the percentage of state
population that voted Republican in the 1980 and 2000 presidential elections. From
1980 to 2000, the Republican variable decreased from an average of 52.1% to
50.4%. This was a 1.6% decrease (difference due to rounding) over 20 years.
States that posted the largest decreases in Republican voting
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Table 4.7:
Average State Share of Total Public Higher Education



















































































































included were Nevada, New Jersey, and California.  Interestingly, Georgia
experienced a 14% increase in Republican voters while Nevada experienced a 14%
decrease.
Correlation and Regression Analysis
In order to determine which variables have influenced these shifts in
privatization as measured by the Rreach0 variable, all sixteen (16) finance variables
were first analyzed through a correlation matrix.  A series of correlations revealed
which combinations of variables were significantly related to each other.  These
variables were then analyzed using regression analysis.
The finance variables were correlated with each other for the first year of
available data. The results of these correlations are presented in Table 4.8 and
Table 4.9.  The results in Table 4.8 indicate that none of the HEGIS/IPEDS or
Census variables were significantly related to RReach0. The Percentage of the State
Share of Total Revenue (SSTR), although not statistically significant, was the
HEGIS/IPEDS variable with the strongest correlation to Rreach0.
 It is interesting to note, however, that most of the HEGIS/IPEDS variables
were significantly related to each other.  Much of this can be explained by the way
the variables were constructed.  Since the Student (STUD) variable was a
component of the Institution (INSTIT) variable, and since the State (STATE)
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variable was a part of the Government (GOV) variable, it is not surprising that
these two pairs of variables would be significantly related to each other. It is also
not surprising that the student variable would be significantly related to the same
variables as the Institution (INSTIT) variable
Table 4.8:










-.023 -.010 .643** 1.000
.872 .948 .000 .
50 50 50 50
-.056 -.003 .665** .985** 1.000
.699 .981 .000 .000 .
50 50 50 50 50
-.053 -.123 -.358* -.007 .069 1.000
.716 .394 .011 .959 .634 .
50 50 50 50 50 50
.016 -.500** .057 .126 .073 .027 1.000
.910 .000 .694 .383 .613 .854 .
50 50 50 50 50 50 50
.053 .277 -.065 .061 .045 -.013 .083 1.000
.715 .051 .655 .674 .758 .928 .566 .
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Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
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for example, the Government (GOV) and State (STATE) variables.  Likewise, it is
not surprising that the Percentage of State Share of Total Revenue (SSTR) and
Student variables would have a significant correlation because decreases in state
support are often related to increases in student tuition and fees.  Nor is it surprising
that the State (STATE) variable would be significantly related to the same variables
as the Government (GOV) variable – for example, the Institution (INSTIT) and
Student (STUD) variables.  It is interesting that the Institution (INSTIT) variable
was significantly related to the Government (GOV) variable.  This is most likely
explained by the fact that from 1978 to 1996 both public (governmental) and
private (non-governmental) support of public higher education increased.
Other results presented in Table 4.8 were based on United States Census
variables.  The results indicate that the Education (EDUC) variable had a
significant negative correlation with Rreach0.  This implies that as the percentage
of a state's college educated population increases Rreach0 decreases (i.e.
privatization increases).  This appears to be counterintuitive and is discussed later
in this chapter.  The other variable, Republican (REPUB) was more related to
Rreach0 than any of the HEGIS/IPEDS variables, although this relationship was
not statistically significant.
 The data in Table 4.9 indicated that none of the Halstead variables were
significantly related to the Reach0 variable.  It is interesting to note, however, that
all but two of the Halstead variables were significantly related to each other.  Much
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of this can be explained by the way the variables were constructed.  All of the
Halstead variables include state wealth (STWEAL) in their construction. It is not
surprising that the Halstead variables would be significantly related to each other
since State Tax Wealth (STWEAL) was the “state and local government tax
revenue collected per capita” (Halstead, 1996, p. 11).
It is interesting that the State Total Taxable Resources (STRHD) variable
was not significantly related to the State Tax Effort (STSUP) variable. State Total
Taxable Resources (STRHD) represented the total collected state tax revenues in
the state per-capita while State Tax Effort (STSUP) represented the “state and local
government tax revenue collected as a percent of state and local tax potential”
(Halstead, 1996, p.11).   Likewise, State Total Taxable Resources (STRHD) was
not significantly related to State Payment Effort (STATPE), which represented the
“percent of state and local government elected tax revenue appropriated for
education operating expenses of public institutions (Halstead, 1996, p. 12)”.
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Table 4.9:
There were significant negative correlations between State Wealth
(STWEAL), State Tax Effort (STSUP) and RReach0. It is interesting that the State
Wealth (STWEAL) variable was negatively related to the RReach0 variable.  This
would suggest that wealthier states were moving toward privatization faster than
comparatively poorer states. It is also interesting that the State Tax Effort (STSUP)
variable was negatively related to the RReach0 variable.   As state tax effort
increased, the ranking of Reach0 decreased. As shown in Table 4.9, State Wealth
and State Tax Effort are highly correlated, and in many ways are measuring similar










-.127 -.183 .800** 1.000
.379 .204 .000 .
50 50 50 50
-.132 -.341* .775** .660** 1.000
.360 .015 .000 .000 .
50 50 50 50 50
-.016 -.132 .767** .710** .479** 1.000
.910 .361 .000 .000 .000 .
50 50 50 50 50 50
-.039 -.096 .635** .445** .033 .545** 1.000
.789 .506 .000 .001 .820 .000 .
50 50 50 50 50 50 50
.004 -.063 .404** .481** .529** .764** -.093 1.000
.979 .662 .004 .000 .000 .000 .518 .





































































Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*.
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**.
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things.  Therefore, only one of these variables, State Wealth, was selected for
continued analysis.
The four variables chosen for further analysis with Rreach0 were State
Wealth 1978 (STWEAL78), State Share of Total Revenue 1976-77 (SSTR77),
Percentage of Republicans 1980 (REPUB80)and Percentage of Adults over 25
Completing Four or More Years of Higher Education (EDUC80) as shown in Table
4.10. These relationships were most likely explained by the fact that even though
public (governmental) and private (non-governmental) support for higher education
increased from 1978 to 1996, the increase in private support proportionately out-
paced the increase in public support.
In order to further consider state funding of public higher education a model
was constructed in which Rreach0 was the dependent variable.   The first year of
available data for State Wealth, State Share of Total Revenue, Percentage of
Republicans Voting Presidential Election and Percentage of Adults over 25
Completing Four or More Years of Higher Education were the independent
variables. The results are presented in Table 4.11.  Regression analysis was used in
order to determine to what extent these finance  variables predicted Rreach0.
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Table 4.10:










.277 -.140 -.013 1.000
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Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Table 4.11: Results of Regression Analysis
Dependent Variable:
Rreach0
Coef. Std. Err. R R2
STWEAL78 .008922 .005 .389 .134
SSTR77 -.810 .212 .487 .237
REPUB80 30.677 38.173 .116 .014
EDUC80 -2.902 .632 .556 .310
Three variables, State Wealth, State Share of Total Revenue, and Education
had an effect on Rreach0.  The Republican variable did not.  The Rreach0 variable
was a ranking of Reach0 with the #1 ranking representing the first state estimated
to reach zero state funding (i.e. the most privatized state) and the #50 ranking
representing the last state to reach zero state funding (i.e. least privatized state).  As
such, increases in Rreach0 refer to states moving from 1 (most privatized) to 50
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(least privatized).  The results of the analysis in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 suggest that
the likelihood of privatization (i.e. higher ranking) increases with increases in State
Wealth (STWEAL).  The results also suggest that the likelihood of privatization
(i.e. higher ranking) increases with increases in State Share of Total Revenue
(SSTR).  Further, the likelihood of privatization (i.e. a higher ranking) is associated
with a higher percentage of state population over the age of 25 having completed
four or more years of higher education (EDUC).
It may seem counterintuitive for there to be a negative relationship
indicating less privatization (increased Rreach0) when there was less state funding
as a percentage of the total revenue for public higher education (SSTR).  Also as
there was less privatization (increased Reach0) there was less education (EDUC).
One reason there might be a negative relationship between Rreach0 and SSTR and
EDUC is that these variables were constructed from different points in time.
Rreach0 was the year (in the future) that the state will reach zero state funding,
while the SSTR was 1976-77 data and EDUC was 1980 data.  It can be argued that
over time the states with a higher than average support for public higher education
(SSTR) and with a higher than average percentage of adults over 25 completing 4
years of college or more (EDUC)have decreased their support of public higher
education at a faster rate than the states who were below average. The higher states
have fallen faster than the lower states with a general shift toward the mean. As
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such, over time the higher supporting states and also the bettereducated states were
predicted to become privatized sooner.
According to Table 4.11, State Wealth (STWEAL78) explained 13% (R
Square) of the variance in Rreach0; State Share of Total Revenue (SSTR77)
explained 23%; the Percentage of Republicans voting in the 1980 presidential
election (REPUB80) explained 1%; and the percentage of adults over 25
completing four or more years of higher education (EDUC80) explained 31%. The
four independent variables, State Wealth, State Share of Total Revenue, Percentage
of Republicans and Percentage of Adults over 25 Completing Four Years or More
of Higher Education were used to develop the more complex finance model
analyzed in Research Question Three.
Research Question Three
Research Question Three (RQ 3) was “Based on the rate of shifting from
state to non-governmental funds over time, which states and institutional types are
more likely to become increasingly privatized?”  In order to consider the data over
time, selected 1978/1980 variables were used as base-line indicators for
privatization.  Selected 1996/2000 variables were combined to represent current
year indicators for privatization, whereas Rreach0 represents future privatization.
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The results concerning Research Question Three are presented by state and by
institutional type.   The three variables used to describe the past, current and
predicted state funding are presented by state in Table 4.12. The past or baseline
funding variable is labeled ZPASFUND; the current funding variable is labeled
ZCURFUND; and the predicted funding variable is labeled Rreach0.  The three
variables are also presented in Tables 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15. In these tables, values
for each state are presented in descending order from highest to lowest score.  The
higher the value, the more likely the public institutions in that state can expect
continued state funding. The three variables are also presented by institutional type
in Table 4.16, 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19.   Finally, a summary of the results presented to
answer Research Question Three was combined with the results from Research
Questions One and Two to answer the First Hypothesis.
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Table 4.12:






































































































Standard Score For Past
Funding               
(ZPASFUND= zstweal78 +
zsstr77 + zeduc80 +
zrepub80)
Standard Score For
Current Funding                 
(ZCURFUND=  zstweal9 +




Note: The Lower The Value The More Likely To Privatize
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Since State Wealth, State Share of Total Revenue, Percentage of
Republicans, and Percentage of Adults over 25 Completing Four or More Years of
Higher Education were found to predict Rreach0 in Research Question Two, these
variables were used to construct the past and current funding scores in this part of
the analysis. Since, these variables were reported using different metrics, they were
converted to standard scores so they could be combined.
The values of 1978 and 1996 State Wealth (STWEAL), the 1977 and 1996
State Share of Total Revenue (SSTR), the 1980 and 2000 Percentage of
Republicans (REPUB), and the 1980 and 2000 Percentage of Adults over 25
Completing Four or More Years of Higher Education (EDUC) were converted to
standard scores.  That is, the values of each of the eight variables were converted to
standard scores with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The standard
STWEAL78, SSTR77, REPUB80 and EDUC80  scores were added together to
create ZPASFUND.  The standard STWEAL96, SSTR96, REPUB00 and EDUC00
were added together to create ZCURFUND.  The same values of Rreach0 as
calculated earlier in the analysis were used to represent the future funding scores.
In order to know if there was any colinearity between STWEAL78,
SSTR77, REPUB80, and EDUC80, a correlation analysis was conducted and
presented previously in Table 4.10.  Significant positive correlations were found
between STWEAL and SSTR and between STWEAL and EDUC.
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The ZPASFUND scores are presented in Table 4.13. The larger values
indicate a lower likelihood that states had privatized public higher education in
1978/1980.  The range of ZPASFUND scores was from -3.85 to +9.46 with a mean
of zero.   The lowest scores were for Arkansas, Mississippi, and Alabama.  The
highest scoring states were Alaska, California, Utah, and New York.
The ZCURFUND scores are presented in Table 4.14.  The range of
ZCURFUND was from -4.85 TO 7.59 with a mean of zero.   The lowest scoring
states were Indiana, Georgia, Vermont, and West Virginia. The highest scoring
states were Alaska, New Jersey and New York.
 The Rreach0 values are presented in Table 4.15. The range of Rreach0 was
from  1 to 50. The states most likely to become privatized according to the Rreach0
were previously described in Research Question Two. Vermont, Rhode Island and
New York were the first states predicted to reach zero state funding.  New Mexico,
Maine and New Jersey were predicted to be the last states to reach zero state
funding.
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Past, current and future funding scores are presented by institutional type in
Table 4.16. The scores presented in Table 4.16 were calculated from state level
data.  In order to calculate average scores by institutional type, the scores assigned
to each state for STWEAL, SSTR, EDUC, and REPUB were assigned to every
institution in that state.  The scores were then averaged by institutional type.
Table 4.16:






























Note: The greater the value the less likely to privatize.
Table 4.17 presents the past funding score, ZPASFUND.  The range of
ZPASFUND across institutional type was from -.89 to .42. The institutional type
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with the lowest score was, Liberal Arts, while Doctoral 2 institutions had the
highest score.


















Table 4.18 presents the current funding score, ZCURFUND. The range of
ZCURFUND across institutional type was from -.35 to .44. The institutional type
with the highest score was Comprehensive 1 institutions. The type with the lowest
score was Research 1 institutions. 



















Table 4.19 represents the future funding score, Rreach0. The range of the
Rreach0 across institutional types was from 19 to 31. Liberal Arts institutions were
predicted to become privatized last whereas Comprehensive 2 institutions were
predicted to become privatized earliest.



















The data presented in Research Questions One, Two and Three were designed to
explore the concept of privatization of public higher education by answering the
First hypothesis, which was: “Public institutions of higher learning have over time
become funded proportionally more by private sources than by state appropriated
sources.”  In answering Research Questions One through Three, the First
Hypothesis was shown to be true in that public institutions of higher learning have
over the past 30 years become funded proportionally more by private sources than
by state appropriated sources.
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The analysis for Research Question One showed that funding has shifted from state
funds to non-governmental funds over time.  This was computed as the change in
state support for public higher education as a percentage of state total revenue.   In
1966-67, 16 states funded over 50% of the operating budgets of their public
institutions of higher education.  By 1995–96 this number had declined to nine
states.  Average state funding declined 4.7%, from 49.7% in 1966–67 to 45% in
1995–96.  With the exception of Doctoral 1 institutions, state support as a share of
total state funds declined by institutional type also.
The analysis for Research Question Two showed that of the finance variables
included, State Wealth  (STWEAL), State Share of Total Revenue (SSTR),
Percentage of Republicans  (REPUB)and Percentage of Adults over 25 Completing
Four or More Years of Higher Education (EDUC) were the best predictors of shifts
away from state support of public higher education.
Finally, the analysis for Research Question Three presented past, current and future
trends in state support for public higher education.  The percentage of state
appropriations State Wealth  (STWEAL), State Share of Total Revenue (SSTR),
Percentage of Republicans  (REPUB)and Percentage of Adults over 25 Completing
Four or More Years of Higher Education (EDUC) were added together to create
past and current funding scores.  The Rreach0 variable was used as the future score.
The analysis found that most states and institutional types experienced reduction in
the proportion of their funding coming form state sources.
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Research Question Four
The Second Hypothesis, “State funding of public institutions of higher
learning is not related to state control,” was examined by answering Research
Questions Four, Five and Six. The data for Research Question Four (RQ 4), “What
variables indicate state control of public higher education and how have these
variables changed over time?” were first organized according to Volkwein’s 1983
and 1995 studies that examined state control of higher education.
The following tables were constructed to examine trends based on
Volkwein’s concept of state control of public higher education.  State control was
composed of two parts, fiscal flexibility and academic flexibility.  Each of the parts
was assigned a score by state.  The fiscal and academic flexibility scores were
added together to create a single score for both 1983 and 1995.  The results are
presented in Table 4.20.  Academic control was defined as the sum of a six-item
composite variable taken from a 1982 Carnegie Foundation survey indicating the
extent to which the state controlled academic aspects of institutions (Volkwein,
1983).  Fiscal control was the sum of nine items that quantified the extent to which
institutions were fiscally controlled by the state. These variables were presented in
Chapter II literature review.
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Table 4.20:
Past, Current & Future Control Scores By State
* * * 102 101 203 * *
98 113 211 100 102 202 -9 193
104 102 206 98 99 197 -9 188
112 101 213 98 101 199 -14 185
104 103 207 99 98 197 -10 187
104 85 189 97 100 197 8 205
112 89 201 100 103 203 2 205
112 107 219 103 99 202 -17 185
104 86 190 100 98 198 8 206
95 105 200 95 99 194 -6 188
104 84 188 99 98 197 9 206
112 110 222 103 102 205 -17 188
109 109 218 98 98 196 -22 174
109 96 205 96 96 192 -13 179
90 108 198 102 104 206 8 214
106 80 186 99 99 198 12 210
95 108 203 99 104 203 0 203
78 105 183 100 98 198 15 213
84 97 181 102 100 202 21 223
101 80 181 99 102 201 20 221
112 110 222 101 100 201 -21 180
112 111 223 103 103 206 -17 189
112 113 225 94 100 194 -31 163
90 104 194 100 100 200 6 206
84 110 194 102 99 201 7 208
95 97 192 100 100 200 8 208
95 85 180 100 98 198 18 216
104 101 205 102 103 205 0 205
112 103 215 100 99 199 -16 183
112 113 225 101 103 204 -21 183
84 104 188 103 99 202 14 216
112 109 221 103 103 206 -15 191
109 104 213 99 102 201 -12 189
87 85 172 101 96 197 25 222
106 113 219 103 104 207 -12 195
78 102 180 97 102 199 19 218
101 98 199 100 95 195 -4 191
106 109 215 102 94 196 -19 177
112 102 214 102 99 201 -13 188
112 89 201 95 99 194 -7 187
84 83 167 100 99 199 32 231
90 103 193 95 100 195 2 197
90 103 193 102 99 201 8 209
95 108 203 100 101 201 -2 199
90 85 175 100 95 195 20 215
112 113 225 103 103 206 -19 187
112 103 215 98 101 199 -16 183
95 96 191 101 98 199 8 207
95 89 184 100 99 199 15 214













































































Note: The lower the value the more likely to privatize. 
Note: * 1983 data not available for AK.
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For the purposes of this study, the 1983 data were considered past control
scores, and the 1995 data were considered current control scores. The future control
scores were calculated by subtracting the 1983 control scores from the 1995 scores,
which produced the amount of change in control over time.  This difference was
then added to the 1995 score to develop the future control score.
Past control scores are arrayed in descending order by state in Table 4.21.
Academic Flexibility scores in 1983 ranged from a score of 78 (Louisiana,
Oklahoma) to 112 (Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Vermont, Washington, Wyoming).  Financial Flexibility scores in 1983
ranged from 80 (Kansas, Maryland) to 113 (Alabama, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
Ohio, Vermont).  The higher scores indicated less control and greater institutional
flexibility.  When the two 1983 scores were added together, the range in total
control was from 225 (Minnesota, New Hampshire, Vermont) to 167 (South
Dakota).   Data was not available for Alaska in the Volkwein 1983 study.
Current control scores are arrayed in descending order by state in Table
4.22.   The 1995 Volkwein study indicated a general shift to less autonomy and
greater state control.  Scores were generally lower in the 1995 study than in the
1983 study.    Academic flexibility scores in 1995 ranged from 94 (Minnesota) to
103 (Delaware, Iowa, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Vermont).
Financial Flexibility scores in 1995 ranged from 94 (Pennsylvania) to 104 (Indiana,
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Kentucky, Ohio, Wyoming).  The higher scores indicated less control and greater
institutional flexibility.   When the two 1995 scores
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Table 4.21:






MN 112 113 225
NH 112 113 225
VT 112 113 225
MI 112 111 223
IA 112 110 222
ME 112 110 222
NM 112 109 221
DE 112 107 219
OH 106 113 219
ID 109 109 218
NE 112 103 215
PA 106 109 215
WA 112 103 215
RI 112 102 214
AZ 112 101 213
NV 109 104 213
AL 98 113 211
CA 104 103 207
AR 104 102 206
IL 109 96 205
ND 104 101 205
WY 112 93 205
KY 95 108 203
UT 95 108 203
CT 112 89 201
SC 112 89 201
GA 95 105 200
OR 101 98 199
IN 90 108 198
MO 90 104 194
MS 84 110 194
TN 90 103 193
TX 90 103 193
MT 95 97 192
WI 95 96 191
FL 104 86 190
CO 104 85 189
HI 104 84 188
NJ 84 104 188
KS 106 80 186
WV 95 89 184
LA 78 105 183
MA 84 97 181
MD 101 80 181
NC 95 85 180
OK 78 102 180
VA 90 85 175
NY 87 85 172








were  added together, the range in total control was from 207 (Ohio) to 192 (Illinois). In
contrast to the 1983 study, Alaska was included in the 1995 study.
Changes in total state control from 1983 to 1995 are examined in Table 4.23.  From 1983
to 1995, two states (Kentucky, North Dakota) had no change in the extent to which they controlled
public higher education, while twenty-four of the remaining states were controlled more.  Maryland,
Massachusetts, New York, South Dakota, and Virginia had the largest decreases in control while
Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, and New Hampshire experienced the largest increases in control.
Future control scores are arrayed in descending order by state in Table 4.24.   They were
calculated by adding the difference between the 1983 scores and the 1995 scores to the 1995 scores.
Future Control Scores ranged from a score of 231 (South Dakota) to 163 (Minnesota).  The higher
scores indicated less control and greater institutional flexibility.     Even though past control scores
were not available for Alaska, given that Alaska’s current control score was 203, we can speculate









AK * 203 * *
SD 167 199 32 231
MA 181 202 21 223
NY 172 197 25 222
MD 181 201 20 221
OK 180 199 19 218
NC 180 198 18 216
NJ 188 202 14 216
VA 175 195 20 215
IN 198 206 8 214
WV 184 199 15 214
LA 183 198 15 213
KS 186 198 12 210
TX 193 201 8 209
MS 194 201 7 208
MT 192 200 8 208
WI 191 199 8 207
WY 205 206 1 207
FL 190 198 8 206
HI 188 197 9 206
MO 194 200 6 206
CO 189 197 8 205
CT 201 203 2 205
ND 205 205 0 205
KY 203 203 0 203
UT 203 201 -2 199
TN 193 195 2 197
OH 219 207 -12 195
AL 211 202 -9 193
NM 221 206 -15 191
OR 199 195 -4 191
MI 223 206 -17 189
NV 213 201 -12 189
AR 206 197 -9 188
GA 200 194 -6 188
IA 222 205 -17 188
RI 214 201 -13 188
CA 207 197 -10 187
SC 201 194 -7 187
VT 225 206 -19 187
AZ 213 199 -14 185
DE 219 202 -17 185
NE 215 199 -16 183
NH 225 204 -21 183
WA 215 199 -16 183
ME 222 201 -21 180
IL 205 192 -13 179
PA 215 196 -19 177
ID 218 196 -22 174









The data created by Volkwein in 1983 and 1995 (Volkwein, 1996, 1997, 1998) were also
used to explain state control of public institutions by institutional type.  Because Volkwein’s data
were state-level data, each public institution in a particular state was assigned its 1983, 1995 and
future control scores, and then the institutions were analyzed by institutional type.  The data are
reported in Table 4.25.  The past control scores ranged from 185 for Comprehensive 2 institutions to
203 Research 2 institutions.  The higher scores indicated less control and greater institutional
flexibility. The present control scores ranged from 199 for Research 1, Doctoral 1, Comprehensive
1, Liberal Arts institutions to 200 for Research 2, Doctoral 2, and Comprehensive 2 institutions.
Table 4:25:
In order to calculate future control scores, the difference from 1983 to 1995 was added to
the 1995 scores for each institutional type.  These scores ranged from 196 for Research 1 institutions
to 215 for Comprehensive 2 institutions.  Except for Comprehensive 2 institutions there was a
narrow range between institutional types for all three time periods.  This may be a result of





















attributing state level scores by institutional type.  Considering these results by institutional type
further is probably of limited value.
Research Question Five
For Research Question Five (RQ5), “How strong was the relationship between state
control and state funding of public institutions of higher learning over time?” the relationship
between state control and funding was analyzed using regression analysis.  This analysis indicated
that there was no relationship between past state funding and past state control of public institutions
of higher education, nor between present state funding and control, or future state funding and
control.  Four-sector matrices were used to illustrate the past and current relationships between
funding and control for states.
Control and Funding
Table 4.26 examines the past, current and future relationships between state funding and
state control of public institutions of higher education using a Pearson’s R correlational analysis. As
explained in Research Question Four, the past control score was the sum of Volkwein’s 1983
Academic and Fiscal Flexibility scores.  The current control score was the sum of Volkwein’s 1995
Academic and Fiscal Flexibility scores.  The future control score was the change in control from
1983 to 1995 added to the 1995 score.
As explained in Research Question Three, the values of 1978/1980 and 1996/2000 State
Wealth (STWEAL), State Share of Total Revenue (SSTR), Percentage of Republicans (REPUB)
and Percentage of Adults over 25 Completing Four or More Years of Higher Education (EDUC)
were converted to standard scores.  That is, the values of each of the four variables were converted
to standard scores with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The standard scores for
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STWEAL78, SSTR77, REPUB80 and EDUC80 were added together to create the past funding
score.  The standard scores STWEAL96, SSTR96, REPUB00 and EDUC00 were added together to
create the current funding score.  The Rreach0 variable was used as the future funding score.
     Table 4.26:










-.087 .332* -.236 1.000
.552 .020 .102 .
49 49 49 49
-.269 .164 -.144 .331* 1.000
.059 .260 .319 .020 .
50 49 50 49 50
.090 -.881** .163 .154 -.006 1.000
.537 .000 .264 .291 .969 .








































Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
The analysis in Table 4.26 describes several relationships. There was no relationship
between past state funding and past state control of public institutions of higher education, nor
between present state funding and control, or future state funding and control.  There was a slightly
negative relationship between past state control and past state funding (r = -0.13), and between
current state control and current state funding (r = -0.24), but they were not significant.  However,
there was a significant positive relationship between past funding and current funding (r = +0.78).
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There was no relationship between future state control and future state funding with
Pearson’s r = -0.01. However there was a significant negative relationship (r = - 0.88) between
future control and the past control. The results of plotting these relationships onto the “Likelihood of
Privatization Matrix” are discussed in the next section.
The Likelihood of Privatization Matrix
The “Likelihood of Privatization Matrix” is a four-sector matrix designed to
illustrate the funding-control relationship between public institutions of higher
learning and state government.  Each sector reflects a relationship based on the
extent to which  states fund and control their public colleges and universities. The
matrices for past and current scores by state are presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
The matrix for future values will be presented in Research Question Six.  The four-
sectors of the privatization matrix are described as State Agency, State Aided, State
Constrained and State Located. The characteristics of these sectors were described
in Chapter Three.
The matrices were constructed to diagram funding and control scores for
each state.  The funding scores were plotted along the vertical axis and the control
scores were plotted on the horizontal axis.  The horizontal and vertical axes were
set to the means of the funding and control scores analyzed for each time period.
The range of past funding scores was from -4.0 to +5.0.  Since the funding scores
were standard scores, the mean was zero by definition.  As shown in Table 4.13,
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the lowest past funding scores were for Arkansas, Mississippi, and Alabama. The
states with the highest past funding scores were Alaska, California, Utah, and New
York.  The range of past control scores was from 167 to 225 with a mean of 201.
As shown in Table 4.21, the highest scores showing the least controlled states were
for Minnesota, New Hampshire and Vermont.  The lowest scores showing the most
controlled states were for New York, South Dakota, and Virginia.
As shown in Table 4.14, the current funding scores range from -4.85 to 7.59. The lowest
scores were for Indiana, Georgia, Vermont, and West Virginia and states with the highest current
funding scores were Alaska and New York with New Jersey and Minnesota.  The current control
scores ranged from 192 to 207 with a mean of 200 as shown in Table 4.22. The lowest scores,
indicating the most controlled states, were for Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota and South Carolina, and
the highest scores, indicating the least controlled states, were for Indiana, Michigan, New Mexico,
Ohio, Vermont, and Wyoming.
Past Likelihood of Funding Matrix by State
Based on its Past Funding score and its Past Control score, each state was plotted onto the
Past Likelihood of Privatization Matrix by State presented in Figure 4.1.  States were diagramed into
one of four sectors. States in the State Constrained sector included, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia,
West Virginia and Wisconsin.  It can be argued that
141
Figure 4.1: Past Likelihood of Privatization Matrix By State
Note: Alaska is not shown in this figure because data was not available for past control.
these states were the most likely to privatize based on past funding and control data. South Dakota
and Mississippi were the most extreme examples in this sector.
States in the State Located sector were Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Vermont.  It can be argued that these states were the second most likely to privatize based on past
funding and control data. Arkansas, Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont were the most extreme








































































State Agency State Aided
State Constrained State Located
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States in the State Agency sector included Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, and Texas.  It can be argued that these states were
the second least likely to privatize based on past funding and control data. New York and
Massachusetts were the most extreme examples in this sector.
States in the State Aided sector included Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, Minnesota, North Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. It can be argued
that these states were the least likely to privatize based on past funding and control data.  California,
Idaho and Minnesota were the most extreme examples in this sector.
Current Likelihood of Funding Matrix by State
Based on its Current Funding score and its Current Control score, each state was plotted
onto the Current Likelihood of Privatization Matrix by State presented in Figure 4.2.   States were
diagramed into the same four sectors.
States in the State Constrained sector included Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia.  It can be argued that these
states were the most likely to privatize based on current funding and control data. Georgia and South
Carolina were the most extreme examples in this sector.
States in the State Located sector included Alabama, Delaware, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Ohio, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  It can be argued that these states were the second most likely to
privatize, based on the current funding and control
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Note: Alaska is not shown in this figure because data was not available for past control.
data. Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Vermont were the most extreme examples in this sector.
States in the State Agency sector included, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.  It can be argued that these states were the second least likely
to privatize, based on the current funding and control data. Minnesota and New York were the most
extreme examples in this sector.
States in the State Aided sector included Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri,
New Jersey, Texas, Utah and Wyoming.  It can be argued that these states were the least likely to




privatize, based on the current funding and control data. New Jersey was the most extreme example
in this sector.
Summary
            Research Question Five explored the relationship between state control and state funding of
public institutions of higher learning over time. There was no relationship between past state
funding and past state control of public institutions of higher education, nor between present state
funding and control, or future state funding and control. Control and funding scores were plotted
onto four-sector matrices to illustrate the relationships. As shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, there was
some movement of states across sector lines. This movement will be discussed in greater detail in
the analysis of Research Question Six.
Research Question Six
To answer Research Question Six (RQ6), “Based on the past relationship between state
control and state funding of public institutions of higher education, what is the predicted
relationship by state and by institutional type?”  future funding values of the Rreach0 variable and
future control scores from Tables 4.15, and 4.24 respectively were plotted for each state onto the
Future Likelihood of Privatization Matrix presented in Figure 4.3. Because the results by
institutional type were considered inconsequential during the analyses of Research Questions Three
and Four, this part of Research Question Six was not pursued.
The Future Likelihood of Privatization by State
The Future Likelihood of Privatization Matrix by State presented in Figure
4.3 utilizes the same four sectors as in the past and current matrices discussed
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previously.  The future funding scores were plotted along the vertical axis and the
future control scores were plotted along the horizontal axis. As explained earlier,
future funding scores were developed by Mortenson and described as Reach0 and
ranked as Rreach0 in this study. This variable consisted of the intercept of a linear
regression that Mortenson computed using state appropriations for public higher
education per $1,000 of personal income by state.  Reach0 for each state was the
year that these appropriations would be reduced to zero if the historical pattern of
state appropriations was extended into the future.   
As shown in Table 4.15, the future funding scores ranged from 1 to 50. As
shown in Figure 4.3, the states most likely to become privatized based on their
future funding scores were Vermont, Rhode Island and New York.   The states least
likely to become privatized were New Mexico, Maine and New Jersey.
As explained earlier, the Future Control scores were developed by
extrapolating results from previous studies conducted by Volkwein.  The control
variable described the extent to which states control their public institutions of
higher learning.  As shown in Table 4.24, the Future Control scores ranged from
163 to 231, with a mean of 199. The
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 Figure 4.3: Future Likelihood of Privatization Matrix by State
* Alaska was not included due to lack of data.
lower a state’s score, the more likely it is to control public higher education in the
future.  The highest scoring states, and therefore the least likely to be controlled,
were Maryland, Massachusetts, New York and South Dakota. The lowest scoring
states, and therefore the most likely to be controlled were Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota
and Pennsylvania.
Based on its Future Funding score and its Future Control score, each state
was plotted on to the Future Likelihood of Privatization Matrix. States were plotted











































































California, Delaware, Georgia, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Vermont and Washington.  It can be argued that these states will be
the most likely to privatize based on future funding and control data. California,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont were the most extreme examples in
this sector based on funding. Minnesota and Vermont were the most extreme
example based on control scores.
 States in the State Located sector included Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New York, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. It can be argued that these states will be the second most
likely to privatize based on future funding and control data. Maryland,
Massachusetts, and New York were the most extreme examples in this sector based
primarily on control scores.
States in the State Agency sector included Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Ohio, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, and
Tennessee.  It can be argued that these states will be the second least likely to
privatize based on future funding and control data. Maine and New Mexico were
the most extreme examples in this sector.
States in the State Aided sector included Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
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South Dakota, West Virginia and Wyoming.  It can be argued that these states will
be the least likely to privatize based on future funding and control data. New Jersey
and South Dakota was the most extreme example in this sector.
The Likelihood of Privatization
Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 showed past, current and future state funding and
control by state.  Table 4.28 summarizes the position of each state in the
privatization matrices in each of the three time periods. Table 4.28 shows the
number of states in each sector in each time period.  In reviewing the trends during
these three time periods, most states shifted to different sectors.  Wyoming
remained in the State Aided sector during all three time periods. Georgia and
Oregon remained in the State Constrained sector during all three time periods. All
other states were in different sectors in at least two of the three time periods. In fact
17 states were in different sectors in all three time periods.
Table 4.28 shows that 23 states did not change sectors from the Past Matrix
to the Current Matrix. All other states did change, with six moving from the State
Located sector to the State Aided sector and six others moving from the State
Aided sector to the State Agency sector. Table 4.28 shows this movement also to a
modest degree. In the Past Matrix 26 states were either in the State Located or the
State Constrained sectors whereas in the Current Matrix 32states were in either the
State Agency or the State Located sectors.    Although the results from Research
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Question Three show proportional levels of funding from state sources have
declined, the movement shown in 4.27 and 4.28
was more along the control dimension.  The remainder of this chapter describes
state movement as shown in the past and future matrices.
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Table 4.27:







AK * Aided *
AL Located Located Agency
AR Located Constrained Agency
AZ Aided Constrained Constrained
CA Aided Agency Constrained
CO Agency Agency Located
CT Aided Aided Located
DE Located Located Constrained
FL Agency Agency Located
GA Constrained Constrained Constrained
HI Agency Agency Located
IA Located Located Agency
ID Aided Agency Agency
IL Aided Agency Agency
IN Constrained Located Aided
KS Agency Agency Aided
KY Located Located Aided
LA Constrained Constrained Located
MA Agency Aided Located
MD Agency Aided Located
ME Located Located Agency
MI Located Located Agency
MN Aided Agency Constrained
MO Constrained Aided Aided
MS Constrained Located Aided
MT Agency Located Located







ND Aided Located Aided
NE Aided Agency Agency
NH Located Located Constrained
NJ Agency Aided Aided
NM Aided Located Agency
NV Aided Located Agency
NY Agency Agency Located
OH Located Located Agency
OK Constrained Agency Aided
OR Constrained Constrained Constrained
PA Located Constrained Constrained
RI Located Located Constrained
SC Located Constrained Constrained
SD Constrained Agency Aided
TN Constrained Constrained Agency
TX Agency Aided Located
UT Aided Aided Located
VA Constrained Agency Located
VT Located Located Constrained
WA Aided Agency Constrained
WI Constrained Agency Located
WV Constrained Constrained Aided
WY Aided Aided Aided
* Data not available for AK
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Table 4.28:
Summary of Changes in Number of States in Each Sector Over Time
State Agency State Aided State Constrained State Located
Past 10 13 13 13
Current 16 8 9 16
Future 12 12 12 13
* Does not include AK
Three states moved from the State Constrained sector in the Past Matrix to
the State Located sector in the Future Matrix. This indicates a likely exchange of
more autonomy (lower control) for less funding.  States in this group included
Louisiana, Virginia and Wisconsin.  Public higher education in these states is
predicted to become more privatized in the future.
Four states moved from the State Aided sector in the Past Matrix to the
State Constrained sector in the Future Matrix.  This indicates a combination of less
funding and less autonomy (greater control).   States in this group included
Arizona, California, Minnesota, and Washington. Since it is unlikely that public
institutions of higher education in these states would willingly exchange less
funding for greater control, it is predicted that they too might push to privatize.
Six states moved from the State Located sector in the Past Matrix to the
State Constrained sector in the Future Matrix. This indicates a likely movement
toward less autonomy (more control) but at similar funding levels.   States in
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this group included Delaware, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, and Vermont. Since it is unlikely that public institutions of higher
education in these states would willingly accept greater control with relatively
unchanged levels of state funding, it is predicted that they might push to privatize.
Eight states moved from the State Agency sector in the Past Matrix to the
State Located sector in the Future Matrix.   This indicates an exchange of less
funding for more autonomy (less control).   States in this group included
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New York, and
Texas. Under these circumstances, it is probably unlikely that public higher
education in these states would push to privatize in the future.
Six states moved from the State Located sector in the Past Matrix to the
State Agency sector in the Future Matrix.  This indicates an exchange of more
funding for less autonomy (greater control).   States in this group included
Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, and Ohio. Public higher education in
these states is predicted to not become more privatized in the future.
More states shifted over time to the State Located sector than to any other. 
As shown in Table 4.28, the State Located sector contained 13 states in the Past
Matrix, 16 in the Current Matrix, and 13 in the Future Matrix.  More states shifted
over time away from the State Aided sector than from any other.  As shown in
Table 4.28, the State Aided sector contained 13 states in the Past Matrix, 8 in the
Current Matrix, and 12 in the Future Matrix.
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Summary
In answering Research Six, it was found that changes in the relationships
between state control and funding exposed several funding/control patterns. Only
the states that experienced more funding-less autonomy (greater control) or less
funding more autonomy (less control) over time were predicted to be less likely to
privatize. States with all of the other funding-control combinations were predicted
to increase the likelihood of privatization.
Chapter Summary
The data and analysis presented in this chapter showed the First Hypothesis,
“Public institutions of higher learning have over time become funded
proportionally more by private sources than by state appropriated sources,” to be
true. Public institutions of higher learning have become funded proportionally more
from private sources than from state appropriated sources over the past 30 years.
The analysis of Research Question One showed that funding has shifted
from state funds to non-governmental funds over time. The analysis of Research
Question Two showed that State Wealth (STWEAL), State Share of Total Revenue
(SSTR), Percentage of Republicans (REPUB) and Percentage of Adults over 25
Completing Four or More Years of Higher Education (EDUC) were the best
predictors of shifts away from state support of public higher education.  The
analysis of Research Question Three showed past, current and future trends in state
154
support for public higher education. Most states and institutional types experienced
reductions in the proportion of their funding from state sources.
The Second hypothesis, “State funding of public institutions of higher
learning is not related to state control,” was found to be true for past, current and
future data. The analysis of Research Question Four described the extent to which
the states controlled public higher education.  For most states, control of public
higher education increased over time. The analysis of Research Question Five
showed that there was no relationship between past state funding and control, or
between current state funding and control.  Finance and control scores were plotted
for each state onto a four-sector Likelihood of Privatization Matrix, creating a
finance-control conceptual model explaining the privatization of public colleges
and universities. In the analysis of Research Question Six, there was no relationship
between future state funding and control. Future Finance and Control scores were
plotted by state on to a four-sector Likelihood of Privatization Matrix. Based on the
movement of states across the sectors, an increasing likelihood of privatization was




. . . public higher education is being privatized.
But I do not see much movement in pubic higher
education to prepare for the change.
-Tom Mortenson, 1999
Introduction
This study contributes to the national discussion regarding higher education
funding by evaluating the extent to which states control and finance public higher
education. Linking institutional control and funding when discussing the future of
higher education allows for a deeper dialogue regarding the likelihood of the
privatization of public higher education. The concept of privatization reframes the
basic notion of what it means to be a public institution of higher learning and the
extent state regulation is connected to funding.   
It has been often reported that state funding for public higher education has
declined and that costs have been shifted to non-governmental sources.  Questions
have been asked regarding the extent to which states should control public higher
education in an environment of reduced public support.  This study examined the
relationship between changes in state funding and control of public higher
education as an attempt to ascertain the extent to which past, current, and future
funding and control contributes to the privatization of public higher education.
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Analyzing trends over time can assist in the development of a theoretical
framework that will make sense of the negotiations that occur annually between
public colleges and their state governments.  This chapter provides a summary of
the background, research methodology, and limitations of this study, followed by
conclusions, ending with policy and research recommendations for future action.
Background
Historically, the economic framework applied to private market concepts
such as price, cost and profit has also been used to assess higher education.  Under
this model, it should be possible to reduce the price charged to consumers for
public higher education by reducing institutional costs through controlling
expenditures.  However, Gordon Winston (1997) considers the economic structure
of a typical college or university to be different from the economic structure of a
private firm.  Winston’s position is that higher education’s financial structure
makes it operate in a fundamentally different and counter-intuitive manner as
compared to a for-profit firm.
Business intuition doesn’t just make it hard to see what’s going on in higher
education, where price doesn’t cover production costs, it distorts our
understanding by making us see the wrong thing: we search for rising
educational costs when they’re falling and we don’t look for evidence of
falling subsidies because business firms don’t pay subsidies. (Winston,
1997, p.117)
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The most significant difference between higher education and the private
sector, according to Winston (1997), is that all institutions of higher education sell
their product, education, at a subsidized price that is “far less than the average cost
of its production” (p. 117).  According to Winston, a private firm prices its product
based on the cost of the product plus profit, whereas a higher education institution
sets its price (i.e. its tuition) at a level below its costs, and subsidizes the difference
from funds from other sources. The following represents Winston’s position:
Private Firm Institution of Higher Learning
Price = Cost + Profit Price + Subsidy = Cost
Winston (1997) further argues that tuition (i.e. price) might go up because
institutional costs go up.  However, tuition may also increase because subsidies go
down. Winston believes decreases in subsidies increases tuition:
The taxpayers’ revolt that restricted state appropriations (donative
resources) has met an increase in enrollments and together these have
reduced student subsidies in public higher education. That, of course, is a
very different picture from the one that comes from business intuition. And
if subsidies go down at a college, it means either of two things. Prices have
to go up or educational spending and quality have to go down, or both.
We’ve seen both. Students in public colleges are paying a higher price in
1995 than in 1987 to get a less costly, lower quality education with fewer
and larger classes and more TAs and TVs.” (p. 124)
The trends which Winston mentions have certainly continued since 1995. The
private firm cost-cutting approach has not reduced the price because private firm
assumptions do not account for the historical declines in state support for higher
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education.  The historical patterns of price, cost and subsidy have, according to the
results of this study, suggested a pattern of privatization.  The consequences of
privatization have only recently been considered in the literature.
Public higher education’s predisposition toward privatization can be
explained by the notion of higher education as a balance wheel. Hovey (1999) uses
this concept to describe where states use higher education as a way to balance state
finances. When state funds are abundant, states tend to allocate more funds to
higher education. When state funds are short, states can disproportionately reduce
the level of support to public higher education compared to other state supported
activities in order to balance their budgets. Legislators believe public higher
education makes a good balance wheel because it has other funding sources it can
turn to, such as tuition, to absorb cuts in state support. They also believe public
institutions have reserves and an ability to absorb short term fiscal stress through
such actions as increases in class sizes and/or teaching loads.
For the purposes of this study, state funding of higher education was
defined as appropriated funding for annual operating expenses. Therefore, the focus
was on past, current, and future funding by the state to an institution.  State control
of higher education was defined as the extent to which the state controlled the
financial and academic operations within a public institution.  As a result, the study
focused on changes in funding and control over time.
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Research Methodology & Findings
Descriptive, bivariate, regression, correlation and time series analyses were
conducted using data from several sources.  Data sources included the revenue
sections of the Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) and the
Integrated Postsecondary Educational Database System (IPEDS) financial survey,
state trend data developed by Kent Halstead with Research Associates of
Washington, estimates of privatization from Tom Mortenson, United States Census
data, and measures of institutional control as developed by Fredricks Volkwein.
This study tested two hypotheses that were further subdivided into six research
questions.
First Hypothesis
The First Hypothesis stated that “Public institutions of higher learning have
over time become funded proportionally more by private sources than by state
appropriated sources.”  The following research questions were developed and
answered in order to test the hypothesis:
1. What was the actual rate of shift from state funds to non-governmental
funds over time by state and by institutional type?
2. What variables have influenced these shifts?
3. Based on the rate of shifting from state to non-governmental funds over




The Second Hypothesis stated that “State funding of public
institutions of
higher learning is not related to state control.” The following research
questions were developed and answered in order to test the hypothesis:
4. What variables indicate state control of public higher education,
and how have these variables changed over time?
5. How strong was the relationship between state control and state
funding of public institutions of higher learning over time?
6. Based on the past relationship between state control and state
funding of public institutions of higher education, what is the
predicted relationship by state and by institutional type?
The analysis of the First Hypothesis and Research Questions One, Two and
Three found that public higher education has over the years become funded
proportionally more by private sources than by state appropriated sources. The
analysis of Research Question One determined that funding to higher education has
shifted over time to more private or non-governmental funding.  From the mid
1960s to the early 1980s there was an increase in the state share of total public
higher education revenues but from the mid-1980s through the 1990s, there was a
decline in state support.  Interestingly, in 1967 states on average contributed only
49.7% of total operating revenues, with 16 states contributing more than 50%.  In
1981-82 there was an increase in the average state contribution of 53.7% of total
operating revenues with 31 states contributing over 50%.  By 1996, state
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commitment had eroded to funding only 45% of the total operating revenues, with
only nine states funding more than 50%.  This data suggests a trend toward
privatization in the second half of the study period.  The decline in the state’s share
of total revenue was evident in all institutional types, except Doctoral 1 institutions.
In order to explain what variables have influenced the shifts in state support
for higher education, Research Question Two looked at the finance variables in this
study.  The dependent variable for the study was Rreach0, a ranking of the variable
constructed by Mortenson to predict the year a state would allocate zero state
appropriated dollars based on historical funding patterns. Rreach0 represented the
likelihood of each state’s potential for privatization of public higher education.
The independent variables for this analysis included six variables
constructed by Halstead that represent state tax wealth, state tax wealth relative to
enrollment, state payment effort, state tax effort, state appropriations, and state
total taxable resources.  From 1978 to 1996, several states experienced extreme
changes as indicated by these variables. Wyoming had a consistent pattern of
decreasing support with declines in state wealth and state total taxable resources
with no change in the state payment effort.  Maine consistently had increases in
state appropriations for higher education, including increased state payment effort
and increased state wealth relative to enrollment.  On the other hand, New York
consistently decreased state appropriations and state payment effort and had one of
the largest increases in state total taxable resources.
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The other independent variables were constructed by using HEGIS/IPEDS
and represented institutional, government, state, and student funding sources for the
years 1978-1996. Institutionally generated or non-governmental revenues increased
from $22 million to $67 million per institution with all states posting increases.
Government appropriations -the sum of federal, state, and local appropriations
increased from an average of $35 million per institution to $69 million.  State
appropriations –increased from an average of $29 million per institution to $56
million. Student funding of public higher education almost quadrupled with an
increase from $8 million to almost $31 million per institution.  Computed from the
HEGIS/IPEDS data was the state share of total revenue or SSTR which from the
years 1977 to1996 decreased from 53.2% to 45%.
The other independent variables were constructed by using U.S. Census
data and represented the percentage of the population over 25 years of age with
four or more years of higher education, and the percentage of the population that
voted Republican in the presidential elections for the years 1980 and 2000. The
percentage of the population over 25 years of age with four or more years of higher
education increased from 16.1% in 1980 to 24.9% in 2000.  The percentage of the
population that voted Republican decreased from 52.1% in 1980 to 50.4% in 2000.
The analysis of Research Question Two determined that of the 16 finance
variables analyzed, the best predictors of privatization were State Wealth
(STWEAL), State Share of Total Revenue (SSTR), Percentage of Republicans
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(REPUB)and Percentage of Adults over 25 Completing Four or More Years of
Higher Education (EDUC).
The analysis of Research Question Three began to explore the likelihood of
privatization by analyzing the variables that were determined to be significant in
Research Question Two.  Standard scores for State Wealth  (STWEAL), State
Share of Total Revenue (SSTR), Percentage of Republicans  (REPUB)and
Percentage of Adults over 25 Completing Four or More Years of Higher Education
(EDUC) were added together to create past and current funding scores. The
Rreach0 variable was used as the future score.  The analysis found that most states
and institutional types experienced reductions in the proportion of their funding
from state sources. One state, Vermont, consistently scored as one of the most
privatized states in the past, present, and future.  These variables were plotted onto
scatter diagrams in order to consider the likelihood of past and current
privatization.  The scatter diagrams illustrated the extent to which all states
received less state support over time.
The Second Hypothesis speculated that state funding of public institutions
of higher learning was not related to state control.  The analysis of the data showed
the hypothesis to be true. There was no relationship between funding and control in
any of the three periods studied.
The analysis of Research Question Four explored past, current, and future
state control of public higher education and the extent to which it changed over
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time.  Generally, state control of public higher education increased from 1983 to
1995.  In grouping the data by institutional type, Research 1 and Research 2 type
institutions generally were controlled more by states than other types.
The analysis of Research Question Five showed the changing relationships
between funding and control by plotting the funding and control scores of each
state onto scatter diagrams providing an interesting set of groupings by state. The
Likelihood of Privatization Matrix, as these diagrams were called, illustrated the
linkage between finance and control of public colleges and universities in four
sectors: State Located, State Constrained, State Agency and State Aided.
Theoretically, the sector where the institutions are most likely to become
privatized is the low-state-funded and high-state-controlled sector, which is referred
to as the State Constrained sector.  It is likely that the public institutions that
operate in the State Constrained sector will become motivated to pursue divestiture
from the state because of steadily declining state support accompanied by
increasing costs associated with state regulation.  Once the fiscal incentives no
longer appear to outweigh the costs of control, it is expected that public institutions
will begin to consider pursuing privatization through negotiation or litigation.
Based on past funding and control scores, states in the State Constrained sector
included Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and
Wisconsin .
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Theoretically, the sector next most likely to become privatized is the low-
state-funded and low-state-controlled sector, which is referred to as the State
Located sector.  Since public institutions of higher learning located in the State
Located states are categorized as less-controlled and less-state-funded, it is
anticipated that they are more independent from the state in terms of fiscal and
academic control and have become more self-sufficient in terms of state funding.
This sector is referred to as State Located in that public institutions currently
operate in a quasi-autonomous manner in terms of the level of state regulation and
state funding.  Based on past funding and control scores, states in the State Located
sector included Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan,
New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont.
Theoretically, institutions in the State Agency sector are the second least
likely to consider privatization. These states provide comparatively high state
funding with more control than states in the other sectors.  It is expected that
sustained state funding will motivate institutions to remain public in spite of
relatively high state control. Based on past funding and control scores, states in the
State Agency sector included Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. Based on current
funding and control scores, states in the State Agency sector included California,
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
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York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington  and
Wisconsin.
Theoretically, the least likely set of institutions to consider privatization are
institutions in states with high state funding and low state control, known as the
State Aided sector. These institutions have relatively greater institutional autonomy
and a greater expectation of sustained funding institutions in other states.
Moreover there is an expectation that these relative funding and regulation levels
will continue.  The combination of sustained funding and comparatively low levels
of control will likely motivate public institutions to remain within the public
domain. Based on past funding and control scores, states in the State Aided sector
included Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, Minnesota,  North Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming.  Based on
current funding and control scores, states in the State Aided sector included
Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, Texas, Utah and
Wyoming.
In answering Research Question Six, it was suggested that based upon the
past and current relationships between state control and funding of public
institutions of higher education, states are likely to exchange autonomy for funding
and funding for autonomy. More states shifted over time to the State Located sector
than to any other sector. The State Located sector had 13 states in the Past Matrix,
16 in the Current Matrix and 13 in the Future Matrix.  More states shifted over time
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away from the State Aided sector than to any other sector.  The Stated Aided sector
had 13 states in the Past Matrix, 8 states in the Current Matrix and 12 states in the
Future Matrix.
The data suggested that in the future states would continue to reduce their
share of funding public higher education.  As a result, the possible effect over time
could be the flattening of the relationships from a four-sector matrix to a two-sector
framework of public institutions of higher learning operating in either State
Constrained or State Located sectors.
Conclusions
According to Winston (1997) our society has developed an intuition about
how universities and colleges should operate based upon the economics of the
private firm.    Consequently, popular notions regarding the price of higher
education have assumed that tuition increases are a function of increased
institutional costs, managed inefficiencies, or perhaps profit taking.  There have
been political efforts to dissect and re-engineer costs to ascertain how to reduce
tuition increases.  However, there is a great deal of evidence that suggests that the
increased price of public higher education actually results from a decrease in
student subsidies.  In the case of public higher education, this means the decrease in
state support in the form of appropriations.
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Based on the findings of this study, the likelihood of public institutions of
higher learning redefining their relationship with state government by
conceptualizing themselves as de facto private institutions seems likely.  The
findings suggest that public institutions of higher learning and states are willing to
exchange autonomy and funding to achieve an optimal relationship.  This exchange
between state and institution may explain state movement -as reflected in the past,
current and future data- between sectors that describe various combinations of the
funding/control relationship.
Based upon past and current relationships between state control and
funding, states and public institutions continue to exchange autonomy for funding
and funding for autonomy.  The results of this study suggest that in the future,
states will continue to reduce their share of funding public higher education.  The
possible effect over time could be the flattening of the relationships described by
the four-sector matrix used in this study to a two-sector framework based on State
Constrained or State Located categories.
This study has provided an argument that a variety of relationships exist
between the state and public higher education.  Considering these relationships
provides a beginning point from which to talk about funding in a more dynamic
manner.  This study advances the plausibility of privatized public higher education.
Understanding the extent to which the states finance public higher education may
assist in making sense of higher education prices, costs and subsidies, which often
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baffle many in and outside of higher education.  Understanding the likelihood of
privatization in public higher education provides an opportunity to reconsider
future policies related to institutional facilities, curriculum, teaching, research,
enrollment and governmental mandates.
Within a privatization paradigm, fundamental elements of higher education
such as institutional facilities, repair, renovation, and new construction would be
reconsidered.  In terms of new construction, a building’s purpose, design,
development and specifications would be regulated according to its funding source.
Facilities that do not receive any state appropriated funds have typically been
regulated in the same manner as facilities completely funded by state
appropriations.  Under a privatization construct, the funding source would be the
controlling source.  As a result, in a privatized world, buildings funded by student
fees, for example, might be reviewed and approved by students or alumni, not by
legislators or their designees.  If the state wanted to maintain control of the
facilities, it would fund the design, development, construction and maintenance of
the facilities.
Curriculum and teaching might provide another good example of the impact
of privatization.  Remedial, multicultural, distance courses and programs have been
state mandated. Issues of tenure and post-tenure review have also been state
regulated.  Currently, public institutions comply with all government mandates
whether funded or unfunded.  In a privatized world, institutions of higher learning
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might only comply with funded mandates. Unfunded directives would be
considered recommendations.
Under a privatization model, if states prohibited certain kinds of research,
privatized institutions might be less affected. For example in the state of Indiana
there is legislation controlling the use of fetal-tissue in basic research by all public
institutions of higher learning. It is anticipated that privatized-public institutions,
with greater institutional flexibility, could pursue research that might otherwise be
prohibited by the state.
Access to higher education services and programs, including admissions
and financial aid policies, would change in a privatized learning organization.
Responses to government mandates regarding affirmative action and admissions
policy provides a good example of possible changes.  Texas, Florida, and
California are among the states where affirmative action is not permitted in
admissions and financial aid.  In a privatized environment, the institutions in these
states might be less affected by these government and legal restrictions and more
able to utilize affirmative action programs similar to those of private institutions.
It is important that higher education administrators understand the
consequences of changes in state funding and control of public higher education
over time.  This study indicated that public institutions of higher learning
continually negotiated their relationship with the state during the period studied.
Institutions in some states may shift slowly and may ultimately be public
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institutions in name only. Institutions in other states may substantially trade
autonomy for funding or funding for autonomy.  Several states appear to be on a
consistent path toward institutional privatization.
Hopefully, this study furthers the understanding of financing higher
education by evaluating states and institutional types and by developing the
Privatization Matrix.  A more robust and reflective understanding of privatization
in public higher education is one benefit.  Acknowledging the likelihood of
privatization of public higher education calls in to question what it means to be a
public institution.  The National Center For  Education Statistics defines a public
institution as being one supported primarily by public funds.  The results of this
study indicate that a reconsideration of that definition may be in order.
Public higher education has historically been very accessible. Yet over the
past 30 years the doors to a higher education have been closing because of
increased costs of attendance.  From a philosophical stand point, higher education
is increasingly viewed as benefiting individual students rather than society in
general.  It follows then that students should bear the greater proportion of the
costs, and societal support, through government subsides, should decrease
proportionately.
However, if we are to be a society that emphasizes the comprehensive
education of its citizens, then education should be a publicly supported enterprise.
If higher education seeks public funds, then higher education should expect public
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control.  This study revealed a paradox: the trend of increasing public control and
inconsistent public funding.  Public higher education appears to be trading funding
and control, with many institutions exchanging state funding for more institutional
autonomy.
Finally, this study challenges what it means to be privatized.  Fifty years
ago Carey (1956) and Simpson (1949) noted that to be of the private sector was
somehow not as efficacious for society as being of the public sector.  Today, higher
education’s place in the public sector may have to be reconsidered.  Is one sector
better than the other, and how should these concepts of public and private affect the
delivery, control and funding of higher education in the future?
Limitations
As an initial exploration of state control and funding, this study provides
interesting conclusions. However several limitations of the study must be noted.
First, using state level data limited analysis by institutional type.  The Halstead
funding variables and the Volkwein control variables were scores from state level
data and allowed for only a preliminary review by institutional type. In order to
calculate average scores by institutional type, the scores assigned to each state were
assigned to every institution in that state.  The scores were then averaged by
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institutional type.  One way to remove this limitation would be to conduct the
analysis with institutional level data sets.
The Reach0 variable may be a limitation in that there are questions
regarding validity in terms of how the variable was constructed.  Reach0 was
calculated by using a simple linear regression of state appropriations to higher
education per $1,000 of personal income in each state.  The Reach0 value for each
state was the year that the regression
predicted appropriations would become zero. But its use was greatly diminished by
outlying states, such as New Mexico.  In order to mitigate this limitation, Reach0
was ranked and Rreach0 was used as a study variable.  Nevertheless, better
methods of predicting future state funding of public higher education should be
developed.
Another limitation was the age of the data.  At the time of the study there
was approximately a 2-year lag from IPEDS data collection to availability.  Also
the most recent Halstead data was for 1998. This limitation could be reduced
through faster availability of IPEDS data and a renewed effort to bring the Halstead
variables up to date.
Recommendations
Considering public higher education by state and by institutional type in
terms of the likelihood of privatization creates a new construct with which to
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consider future public policy and research.  The fundamental policy question
concerning what portion of state wealth is appropriated to public higher education
should be answered only after states resolve the question of whether they want to
provide higher education directly to their citizens or contract with an independent
organization. Questions of who should pay for higher education should be
answered only after questions of control are addressed.  In order to develop future
policy and research recommendations, five questions are presented:
1. How privatized does an institution have to become before it is no longer
under state control?
2. Given the changes in state investment in higher education, should there
be any changes in state control policies and practices?
3. Given the decrease in the proportion that states fund their institutions of
higher education, should there be a change in the definition of what it
means to be a public institution?
4. If students become the primary funding source for higher education,
should the level to which they influence higher education policy
increase?
5. If the states become a secondary funding source, then to what extent
should they regulate higher education, and who should pay the costs
associated with the regulation?
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Policy Recommendations
This study explores changes in state funding and control as a form of
privatization of public higher education.  Based upon the results of this study, the
following policy recommendations are presented in response to the five questions:
Question 1:
How privatized does an institution have to become before it is no longer
under state control?
Policy Recommendations:
• State governments should adopt policies requiring that all state
mandates to institutions of higher education include state
appropriations to implement them, thus halting the historical
practice of unfunded mandates.
• All institutions of higher learning should be defined by the funding
source that provides the largest proportion of their operating
budgets.
• All institutions of higher learning should be able to contract with the
state to provide a negotiated set of goods and services.
Question 2:
Policy Recommendation:
Given the changes in state investment in higher education, should there be
any changes in state control policies and practices?
• States should only regulate what they fund.  As such, institutions
should publicly indicate the sources of all funds as a general
practice.
Question 3:
Given the decrease in the proportion that states fund their institutions of
higher





• For the purposes of NCES classification, the definition of public
higher education should not be based on sources of funding but
rather on institutional mission.
Question 4:
If students become the primary funding source for higher education, should
the level to which they influence higher education policy increase?
Policy Recommendation:
• As public institutions of higher education become privatized, they
should adopt governance practices associated with private
institutions.
Question 5:
If the states become a secondary funding source, then to what extent should
they
regulate higher education, and who should pay the costs associated with the
regulation?
Policy Recommendation:
• Institutions should fully disclose to students and campus
constituents the full cost of governmental regulatory compliance.
The cost of unfunded mandates should be charged to the funding
source that supports the activity associated with the regulation.
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Research Recommendations
Research recommendations, which stem from the questions of institutional
finance and control that emerged from this study, include the following:
Question 1:
How privatized does an institution have to become before it is no longer
under state control?
Research Recommendations:
• Further research should be conducted to determine the costs and
benefits of privatizing public institutions of higher learning by state.
• Further study should be conducted by institutional type.
• Such research should include exploring the institutional cost of
complying with governmental regulation.
• Further research should be conducted to consider the extent to which
public institutions of higher learning forego potential revenues as a
result of their affiliation with state government.
• Case studies of individual institutions should be carried out as they
move toward privatization.
Question 2:
Given the changes in state investment in higher education, should there be
any changes in state control policies and practices?
Research Recommendation:
• Higher education accounting procedures should be evaluated to
make  higher education costs less opaque and more understandable
to all institutional stakeholders and the general public.
Question 3:
Given the decrease in the proportion that states fund their institutions of
higher





• NCES should conduct a review, including a national discussion, of
what it means to be a public institution in order to develop a new
operational definition.
• NCES should present information according to the updated
definition.
• Because funding data are aggregated by state more there should be
further study by institutional type.
Question 4:
If students become the primary funding source for higher education, should
the level to which they influence higher education policy increase?
Research Recommendation:
• The similarities and differences in student influence on higher
education policy at public and private institutions should be
reviewed.  The purpose would be to compare private institution
governance with the public institution approach in order to guide
changes in student and alumni roles that might be needed as public
institutions privatize.
Question 5:
If the states become a secondary funding source, then to what extent should
they
regulate higher education, and who should pay the costs associated with the
regulation?
Research Recommendation:
• The cost of institutional compliance with state regulation should be
studied further to understand whether differences exist in state
regulation of public higher education compared to private higher
education.
In conclusion, the answers to the two hypothesis and six research questions
that comprised the research section of this dissertation generated more questions for
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delving further into the complexities associated with public higher education
finance and control.
Public higher education is indeed becoming more privatized. The proportion of
institutional budgets supported by states continues to drop. In a few states,
questions are beginning to be asked about whether public colleges and universities
should continue to be subject to the same levels of control as in the past.  This
finance/control debate will no doubt continue, and its impact on public institutions
of higher education could be profound.
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Appendix A
Carnegie Classification of Institutional Types
This appendix is taken from the definition section of the CASPAR database and
provides the explanation of how the institutions were coded for institutional type.
The attribute CARNEGIE was derived from the Carnegie Foundation's
copyrighted, "A Classification of Institutions of Higher Education," which
categorizes institutions based on the level of degree offered and other indicators of
the "comprehensiveness" of an institution's mission. For active degree-granting
institutions accredited by an agency of the U.S. Secretary of Education, the
CARNEGIE attribute was based on the 1994 Carnegie Classification; for other
institutions, it was based on the most recently available Carnegie classification. The
CARNEGIE attribute has the following values:
R1  – Research Universities I
Award 50 or more doctoral degrees per year, and receive $40 million or
more per year in federal research support.
R2  – Research Universities II
Award 50 or more doctoral degrees per year, and receive $15.5– $40
million per year in federal research support.
        
D1  – Doctoral Universities I
Award 40 or more doctoral degrees per year across at least five
disciplines.
         
D2  – Doctoral Universities II
Award 10 or more doctoral degrees per year across at least three
disciplines, or 20 or more doctoral degrees per year in total.
         C1  – Master’s (Comprehensive) Universities and Colleges I
Award 40 or more master's degrees per year across at least three
disciplines.
C2  – Master’s (Comprehensive) Universities and Colleges II
Award 20 or more master's degrees per year across all disciplines.
         
LA1 – Baccalaureate (Liberal Arts) Colleges I
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Award 40 percent or more bachelor’s degrees in liberal arts fields.
Selective admissions.
         LA2 – Baccalaureate (Liberal Arts) Colleges II




Comments Regarding the IPEDS/HEGIS Data
These comments provide specific information regarding the history and
compilation of the IPEDS/HEGIS database.
According to the WEB CASPAR System:
In 1987 there was a major change in the definition of
revenue from hospitals that affects temporal comparability of
revenue data elements. Beginning in 1987, revenue from
hospitals was expanded to include not only revenues from
hospitals' sales and services, but also gifts, grants,
appropriations, research revenues, endowment income, and
all appropriations received from Federal, state, and local
governments for the operation of hospitals. (CASPAR Web
site, http://www.caspar.nsf.gov, 2001)
Consequently, this study excluded hospital revenues in an
attempt to minimize any erroneous correlations due to changes
in the database redefinition.
Financial Aid was another revenue source that was excluded. IPEDS treats
Pell Grants as a funding source, but this study did not include financial aid.
The following are CASPAR- or NCES-initiated quality control efforts as
outlined on the  CASPAR Web site, http://www.caspar.nsf.gov:
These data have been checked and verified to correspond to data
in the following NCES publication: Current Funds Revenues and
Expenditures of Degree-Granting Institutions: Fiscal Year 1996.
In addition, these data have been checked and verified to
correspond to data in the table, "Appendix E: Current Year
Finance Report FY 1996," which was provided by NCES with
the raw data files.
Data for earlier years were checked and verified to correspond to
data in similar NCES tables.
Data in NCES publications are for the 50 United States plus the
District of Columbia and will not match CASPAR data for the
183
50 United States plus the District of Columbia, because NCES
data reflect the state of the reporting unit, while CASPAR data
reflect the state of the main unit. In CASPAR, multiple reporting
units are combined under the FICE code of the main unit and
reporting units may be located in different states (or territories)
than that of the main unit. NCES data for the 50 United States
plus the District of Columbia may be more closely approximated
in CASPAR by including "Unknown State" with the 50 United
States plus the District of Columbia.
Beginning with 1996 data, the NCES has changed the subset of
the postsecondary institutional universe for which data are
generally reported. Previous reports were concerned primarily
with enrollment in postsecondary institutions that were
accredited at the college level by an agency recognized by the
Secretary, U.S. Department of Education (ED). Current NCES
publications subset the postsecondary institutional universe on
the basis of the degree-granting status (information that is
available directly from IPEDS) as well as eligibility for Title IV
federal financial aid (based on listed of eligible institutions
maintained by ED's Office of Postsecondary Education).
Currently, Web CASPAR continues to report data for all years
on the subset of postsecondary institutions accredited at the
college level by an agency recognized by the Secretary, U.S.
Department of Education. Therefore, Web CASPAR data will
not match data published by NCES for degree granting, Title IV-
eligible institutions.
Please pay close attention to the subset of the postsecondary
institutional universe for which NCES data are reported when
comparing NCES data to Web CASPAR data.
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Appendix C
Higher Education Price Index (HEPI)
Year Deflator
1996 Deflate by 1.7330
1995 Deflate by 1.6830
1994 Deflate by 1.6330
1993 Deflate by 1.5800
1992 Deflate by 1.5350
1991 Deflate by 1.4820
1990 deflate by 1.4080
1989 deflate by 1.3280
1988 deflate by 1.2610
1987 deflate by 1.2090
1986 deflate by 1.1630
1985 deflate by 1.1080
1984 deflate by 1.0480
1983 deflate by 1.0000
1982 inflate by  0.9390
1981 Inflate by  0.8580
1980 Inflate by  0.7750
1979 inflate by  0.7050
1978 inflate by  0.6570
1977 inflate by  0.6150
1976 inflate by  0.5780
1975 inflate by  0.5430
1974 inflate by  0.4990
1973 inflate by  0.4670
1972 inflate by  0.4430
1971 inflate by  0.4210
1970 inflate by  0.3950
1969 inflate by  0.3710
1968 inflate by  0.3490
1967 inflate by  0.3290




The following are the names of the surveys from which the HEGIS/IPEDS study
variables were extracted:
Financial Statistics - Current Funds Revenues, FY 1966-1996
Adjusted Total Current Funds Revenues (Excl Pell Grants)
Tuition and Fees
Federal Government Appropriations
Federal Appropriations Through State Channels
Computed State and Local Government Appropriations
Adjusted Federal Government Grants and Contracts (Excl Pell Grants)




Sales and Services of Educational Activities
Revenues from Auxiliary Enterprises
Revenues from Other Sources




State            Stabbr                  Fips Obe          Regional Code Region Accreditation
Alabama AL 01  5 -Southeast SC
Alaska AK 02 8 - Far West NW
Arizona AZ 04 6 - Southwest NH
Arkansas AR 05 5 - Southeast NH
California CA 06 8 - Far West W
Colorado CO 08 7 - Rocky Mountains  NH
Connecticut CT 09 1 - New England E
Delaware DE 10 2 - Mid East M
District of Col DC 11 2 - Mid East M
Florida FL 12 5 - Southeast SC
Georgia GA 13 5 - Southeast SC
Hawaii HI 15 8 - Far West W
Idaho ID 16 7 - Rocky Mountains NW
Illinois IL 17 3 - Great Lakes NH
Indiana IN 18 3 - Great Lakes NH
Iowa IA 19  4 - Plains NH
Kansas KS 20 4 - Plains NH
Kentucky KY 21 5 – Southeast SC
Louisiana LA 22 5 - Southeast SC
Maine ME 23 1 - New England E
Maryland MD 24 2 - Mid East M
Massachusetts MA 25 1 - New England E
Michigan MI 26 3 - Great Lakes NH
Minnesota MN 27 4 - Plains NH
Mississippi MS 28 5 - Southeast SC
Missouri MO 29 4 - Plains NH
Montana MT 30 7 - Rocky Mountains  NW
Nebraska NE 31 4 - Plains NH
Nevada  NV 32 8 - Far West NW
New Hampshire NH 33 1 - New England E
New Jersey NJ 34 2 - Mid East M
New Mexico NM 35 6 - Southwest NH
New York NY 36 2 - Mid East M
North Carolina NC 37 5 - Southeast SC
North Dakota ND 38 4 - Plains NH
Ohio OH 39 3 - Great Lakes NH
Oklahoma OK 40 6 - Southwest NH
Oregon OR 41 8 - Far West NW
Pennsylvania PA 42 2 - Mid East M
Rhode Island RI 44 1 - New England E
South Carolina SC 45 5 - Southeast SC
South Dakota SD 46 4 - Plains NH
Tennessee TN 47 5 - Southeast SC
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Texas TX 48 6 - Southwest SC
Utah UT 49 7 - Rocky Mountains  NW
Vermont VT 50 1 - New England E
Virginia VA 51 5 - Southeast SC
Washington WA 53 8 - Far West NW
West Virginia WV 54 5 - Southeast NH
Wisconsin WI 55 3 - Great Lakes NH
Wyoming WY 56 7 - Rocky Mountains NH
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